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ESSAYS ON STRUCTURAL MODELING OF LIFE CYCLE BEHAVIOR
Natalia Khorunzhina, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2011
In the economic literature there are divergences on a number of issues between the results
obtained with macro- and micro-based models. Habit formation in consumption is one ex-
ample of such disagreement. Another example is the discrepancy between the theoretical
prediction that all investors should participate in stock markets if the equity premium is
positive, and empirical evidence that a substantial fraction of individual consumers do not
invest in stock markets. A primary goal of my thesis is to try narrowing the gap between
the results in these two literatures, looking at the problem from the prospective of house-
holds. Chapter 1 develops a nonlinear GMM estimator to investigate the presence of habit
formation in household consumption. The estimation results support the existence of habit
formation in food consumption. Next, I exploit the property of habit formation preferences
to generates the time- and individual-varying Relative Risk Aversion and Intertemporal Elas-
ticity of Substitution to analyze the degree of heterogeneity in these coefficients. I find that
these parameters display significant variation across individuals and over time. In Chapter
2 I develop a dynamic structural model of stock market participation and portfolio choice to
investigate whether financial education programs can affect consumers’ choices and increase
participation in financial markets. I estimate the model, where the consumers’ decisions re-
garding stock market participation are influenced by participation costs. The results provide
evidence that the participation cost is substantial. The model estimates are then used to
conduct simulation exercises to evaluate the effect of financial education programs.
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1.0 ESTIMATION OF OPTIMAL CONSUMPTION CHOICE WITH
HABIT FORMATION AND MEASUREMENT ERRORS
1.1 INTRODUCTION
In this paper we empirically investigate the presence of internal habit formation in household
food consumption using data from the Panel Study on Income Dynamics (PSID). We assume
that habit formation takes a multiplicative (or ratio) form and that observed consumption is
measured with error (i.e., assumed to be classical). The consumption Euler equation belongs
to a class of moment conditions for which we develop a method to account for measurement
errors without parametric assumptions on the distribution of measurement errors. We then
exploit the structure of the Euler equation to develop a nonlinear generalized method of
moments (GMM) estimator. We prove identification of all the structural parameters of
interest: the time-discount factor, the utility curvature parameter, and the habit formation
parameter. A small simulation exercise shows that the proposed estimator performs well in
recovering the parameters of interest. The simulation exercise also shows that not accounting
for measurement errors leads to underestimation of the utility curvature parameter and
the strength of habits. We find that habit formation is an important determinant of food
consumption patterns.
In models of habit formation with measurement errors, the Intertemporal Elasticity of
Substitution (IES) and Relative Risk Aversion (RRA) are generally not point identified
without further assumptions. We develop bounds on the IES and RRA that account for
measurement errors and compute asymptotically valid confidence intervals on these bounds
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using the parameter estimates from the model. Post estimation analysis also shows that
the IES is decreasing and convex in age and displays a U shape in income. Also, the RRA
is increasing and concave in age, dome shaped in income, and increasing in the level of
education.
Allowing for habit formation in consumption offers a tractable approach to modeling
time nonseparabilities in preferences. Time nonseparabilities in preferences have been used
to explain a wide variety of macroeconomic and financial phenomena. In the representative
agent framework, the empirical evidence largely supports the existence of habit formation in
consumption.1 However, in micro data the evidence of habit formation is inconclusive. The
studies of Carrasco, Labeaga, and Lopez-Salido (2005) and Browning and Collado (2007)
support habit formation in food consumption, while those of Meghir and Weber (1996) and
Dynan (2000) do not. Comparisons between these results are confounded by differences in
the specification of preferences, the approximations employed to obtain estimating equations,
and differences in the data employed in estimation. Carrasco, Labeaga, and Lopez-Salido
apply the test proposed by Meghir and Weber on a different data set of the same frequency.
However, the data set is longer, and Carrasco, Labeaga, and Lopez-Salido argue that this
is the main reason for their contrasting conclusions. In this paper, we employ the same
data set as in Dynan, that is, household food consumption data from the Panel Study on
Income Dynamics (PSID). However, we find evidence of significant habit formation in food
consumption. We argue that the differences in results stem mainly from the differences in
the estimation approach as well as the treatment of measurement errors in consumption
and other unobserved heterogeneity. Our results are directly comparable not only to micro
studies such as Dynan (2000), but also to the large body of macroeconomic literature.
In our analysis, we assume that individual preferences over food consumption is charac-
terized by the multiplicative habit formation specification introduced in Abel (1990), where
consumption services is given by c˜t = ct/c
α
t .
2 The main alternative to this specification is
the difference model of habit that is widely assumed in macroeconomic studies and some
1See Fuhrer (2000), Chen and Ludvigson (2008), and Smith and Zhang (2007) for later examples.
2In general, consumption services is given by c˜t = ct/h
α
t with ht = f(ct−1, ht−1).
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important microeconomic studies. In this case, consumption services is given by, for example
c˜t = ct − αct−1. The choice of the multiplicative specification is motivated by two related
points. First, individual consumption data is more volatile than aggregate consumption
data. As a result, while the restriction that consumption services is positive is relatively
easy to satisfy in the difference specification using aggregated data, it is likely to be violated
in micro data when the difference specification is assumed. The fact that the multiplicative
specification of consumption services satisfies this positivity constraint for any pair (ct, ct−1)
makes it more appropriate when employing micro data.
Second, under the multiplicative specification of habits, the model belongs to a class of
moment conditions for which we develop a method for controlling for classical measurement
errors without imposing parametric assumptions on the distribution of measurement errors.
This method also avoids imposing log-linearizations and other assumptions on the Euler
equation to obtain an estimable equation.
We show that all parameters of interest are identified from the moment condition, and
develop a nonlinear GMM estimator for these parameters. To the best of our knowledge,
this paper presents the first exact Euler equation nonlinear GMM method developed to
investigate the existence of habit formation without imposing parametric assumptions on
the distribution of measurement errors.
In order to investigate the small sample properties of the estimator, we perform a sim-
ulation exercise where we solve a life-cycle model with multiplicative habit consumption
services. Two sets of estimation procedures are examined. The first is replication of the
procedure employed by Dynan (2000), and the second is the procedure developed in this
paper. The results from implementing the estimator developed in Dynan (2000) using the
simulated data reject the existence of habit formation. On the other hand, the simulation
exercise shows that the estimator developed in this paper performs well in recovering the
parameters of interest. Also, the results indicate that ignoring measurement errors in food
consumption results in a downward bias in the estimate of the habit formation parameter.
The estimator developed in this paper is implemented using household food consump-
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tion data from the PSID. The results from the baseline model support the existence of a
strong habit in food consumption. We also find that ignoring measurement errors weakens
significantly the evidence of habit formation.
A variety of modifications to the baseline model are considered. Three key modifications
are: (i) allowing of aggregate effects in the expectations error; (ii) restricting the sample
to households that are not liquidity constrained; and (iii) extending the model to allow for
external habit formation. We find that estimates of the structural parameters are robust
across these specifications. The estimate of the external habit formation parameter is positive
and statistically significant, but small relative the the internal habit formation parameter.
Habit formation also generates time- and individual-varying coefficients of relative risk
aversion (RRA) and intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES). We exploit this property
and derive inferences about these economic quantities, which constitutes another novelty of
the paper. Until recently, little was known about changes in risk aversion and intertemporal
substitution across groups of individuals and over time.3 Because observed consumption is
measured with error, the implied household- and time-specific IES and RRA are not observed.
Furthermore, the expectation of the IES and the RRA is not point identified. We define
bounds for the conditional expectations of the IES and the RRA. We estimate these bounds
and report asymptotically valid confidence intervals. For the preferred specification, the 95%
confidence interval for the IES is [0.086, 0.189] and the corresponding 95% confidence interval
for the RRA is [5.258, 13.093]. We also investigate the patterns of the IES and the RRA via
regression analysis of the implied IES and RRA on household demographic characteristics.
We find that the IES is decreasing and convex in age, and exhibits a U shape with respect
to income. We also find that the RRA is increasing in concave in age, exhibits a dome shape
with respect to income, and is increasing in education.
3See Allan and Browning (2009) and the references therein for a discussion on the recent developments
in investigating individual heterogeneity in the RRA.
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1.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Household i chooses a sequence of consumption {cis, s = t, · · · , T} to maximize its expected
lifetime utility function, given by
Eit
T∑
s=t
βs−tφis
c˜1−γis − 1
1− γ ,
where the expectation is taken conditioning on all relevant information for household i at
time t; β ∈ (0, 1) is the time-discount factor; γ the utility curvature parameter; and c˜it
denotes consumption services in period t. Consumption services is defined as the ratio
between current consumption expenditures and past consumption expenditures geometrically
weighted:
c˜it =
cit
cαit−1
,
where 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 measures the strength of habits; α = 1 denotes the highest, while α = 0
indicates no habit in consumption.
The importance of augmenting the individual utility function with individual-specific
taste shifters has been widely accepted in the estimation of optimal consumption choices
with micro data. Household-specific “taste shifters” φit are given by
φit = exp(δ
′wit + ωi),
where wit is a vector of exogenous time-varying observed household characteristics and ωi is
a household fixed effect.
We assume that household i is not subject to liquidity constraints and has rational
expectations. The first-order necessary condition for the household’s optimization problem
is
E [β(1 + ri,t+1)MUi,t+1 −MUi,t|zit] = 0, (1.2.1)
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where ri,t+1 is the rate of return available to household i between periods t and t + 1, zit
denotes the set of all information that is available to household i at time t, and MUi,t
represents household i’s marginal utility of consumption in period t:
MUi,t =
φit
cit
(
cit
cαit−1
)1−γ
− αβφit+1
cit
(
cit+1
cαit
)1−γ
. (1.2.2)
Notice that if α = 0, MUit in equation (1.2.2) reduces to the marginal utility of time separable
models. For α > 0, consumption services are negatively related to past consumption levels.
This property is shared with difference models of habit formation with positive α (i.e.,
c˜it = cit−αcit−1). However, α > 0 is not sufficient for the multiplicative model to characterize
habit formation. The multiplicative model also requires γ > 1 to exhibit habit formation.
Indeed, as long as both α > 0 and γ > 1, the household’s marginal utility of consumption in
period t is an increasing function of period t − 1 consumption, yielding a complementarity
effect of consumption over time.
Substituting Equation (1.2.2) into Equation (1.2.1) obtains the following moment condi-
tion:
E
[
β(1+rit+1)
(
φit+1
cit+1
(
cit+1
cα
it
)1−γ
−αβ φit+2
cit+1
(
cit+2
cα
it+1
)1−γ)
−φit
cit
(
cit
cα
it−1
)1−γ
+αβ
φit+1
cit
(
cit+1
cα
it
)1−γ∣∣∣zit]=0 (1.2.3)
1.3 THE ESTIMATOR
In order to derive an exact nonlinear GMM estimator of the parameter vector of inter-
est from Equation (1.2.3), we address two key issues: nonstationarity of consumption and
measurement errors in consumption. We discuss these issues in turn.
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1.3.1 Consumption growth
The estimator derived in this paper is designed for panel data where the number of households
N is large relative to the number of time periods T . The asymptotic properties of the
estimator are derived assuming that N goes to infinity and T is fixed. We assume that the
(time) vector of household observations is drawn independently from a common distribution.
This is in contrast to the implementation using time series data, where the typical sufficient
condition is stationarity of the variables. However, the resulting estimator may be subject
to small sample instability problems in the panel data context if the data are not stationary.
Because consumption trends over time, we transform the moment equation (Equation 1.2.3)
into one that is expressed in terms of the growth rates of consumption. Let git = cit/cit−1,
and ϕit = φit/φit−1. Then Equation (1.2.3) can be written as
E
[
β(1+rit+1)
ϕit+1
git+1
(
git+1
gα
it
)1−γ(
1−αβϕit+2
(
git+2
gα
it+1
)1−γ)
−
(
1−αβϕit+1
(
git+1
gα
it
)1−γ)∣∣∣∣∣zit] = 0. (1.3.1)
Notice that by expressing Equation (1.2.3) in terms of growth in consumption, is that the
unobserved household fixed effects ωi are eliminated, so that ϕit = exp(δ
′∆wit).
1.3.2 Measurement error
Given a set of appropriate instruments and the absence of measurement errors, consistent
estimators of the parameters α, β, γ, and δ′ can be obtained based on the moment condition
in Equation (1.3.1). However, the estimation of nonlinear rational expectation models using
micro data is complicated by the problem of measurement errors in consumption, which, if
ignored, will likely result in inconsistent estimation of the key parameters of interest.
Log- linearization of the Euler equation has the advantage of remaining tractable when
accounting for measurement errors in consumption in both time-separable and nonsepara-
ble models.4 However, as discussed in Carroll (2001), a log-linear approximation can result
4Log-linearization of the Euler equation allows Dynan (2000) to account for measurement errors in con-
sumption expenditures without additional parameterization while testing for nonseparabilities in individual
current and past consumption.
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in severe bias of the parameter estimates. Nonlinear GMM estimators based on the Euler
equation provide an alternative to log- linearization, but without additional distributional
assumptions, the problem of measurement errors remains difficult. Significant progress has
been made in accounting for classical measurement error in time-separable models. Ven-
tura (1994) assumes that measurement errors are serially independent and lognormally dis-
tributed, while Hong and Tamer (2003) assume that the measurement errors are independent
and that their marginal distributions are Laplace with zero mean and unknown variance.
After re-parametrization, the approaches in Ventura (1994) and Hong and Tamer (2003)
(applied to the time-separable Euler equation) yield similar moment conditions for the esti-
mation of the utility curvature parameter subject to a proper set of instruments. However,
the time-discount factor remains unidentified.
Nonseparabilities in preferences add another layer of difficulty into nonlinear estimation
with classical measurement errors. Due to the increasing complexity of the moment condi-
tions with habit formation, measurement errors cannot be easily separated from observed
consumption. Thus, to our knowledge, there are no studies that apply nonlinear estimators
to test for time- nonseparabilities in individual preferences over consumption accounting for
measurement errors.5
The method developed in this paper for accounting for measurement errors can be applied
to a larger class of moment conditions than equation (1.3.1). We therefore first present the
general framework and then discuss its application to equation (1.3.1).
1.3.2.1 A method for controlling for classical measurement errors in nonsepa-
rable models Consider the following moment condition:
E
[
κ+
K∑
k=1
ϕk(wk; δ) · f˜k(xk; θ)|z
]
= 0, (1.3.2)
5Chen and Ludvigson (2008), and Smith and Zhang (2007) undertake the empirical estimation of the
consumption model with habit formation using nonlinear exact estimation. But the authors deal with
aggregate consumption data where measurement errors issue are not a significant concern.
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where: κ is a known constant; δ and θ are the parameters of potential interest; w =
(w1, . . . , wK), and x = (x1, . . . , xK) are sets of regressors; and z is a set of instruments.
However, the xk’s are not observed by the econometrician. Instead, what is observed is the
corresponding set x∗k of noisy measures of xk. Assume xk and x
∗
k are related by the equation
x∗k = xkηk, where ηk denotes unobserved measurement errors.
Suppose the data generating process and the functional forms satisfy the following as-
sumptions.
Assumption 1.3.1. For k = 1, · · · , K:
1. the random vector (wk, xk, z) is independent from ηk;
2. the function f˜k(a · b; θ) satisfies the following separability condition, f˜k(a · b; θ) = fk(a; θ) ·
hk(b; θ); and
3. Ak ≡ E[hk(ηk; θ)] 6= 0.
Assumption 1.3.1.1 is a typical classical measurement error independence assumption.
For example, this independence assumption is also made in Hong and Tamer (2003). How-
ever, unlike Hong and Tamer (2003), the method developed here does not impose parametric
restrictions on the distribution of measurement errors. Furthermore, we do not require the
measurement errors ηk and ηl to be uncorrelated for k 6= l. A weaker mean independence
restriction is assumed by Hausman et al (1991) and Schennach (2004). However, to identify
the parameters of interest, these authors also assumed the existence of an additional noisy
measure of the true unobserved regressor. The method developed here does not rely on the
existence of auxiliary data sets. The separability restriction of Assumption 1.3.1.2 holds for
the Euler equation (1.3.1) and also holds for a variety of other applications. A sufficient con-
dition for Assumption 1.3.1.2 to hold is that f˜k(xk; θ) is a power function of xk. Assumption
1.3.1.3 is a regularity assumption which holds in general if measurement error is specified
in the multiplicative form. Strictly speaking, Ak is a function of the parameter vector θ
and the distribution of the measurement errors. The actual functional form may be known
if the distribution of the measurement errors is assumed to be known up to a set of finite
dimensional parameters. The following proposition shows that under Assumption 1.3.1 the
9
moment condition in equation (1.3.2), which is a function of the unobserved xks, can be
transformed into an expression which is a function of the observed x∗ks and the additional
parameters Ak.
Proposition 1.3.2. Consider the moment condition 1.3.2. Suppose Assumption 1.3.1 hold.
Then
0 = E
[
κ+
K∑
k=1
ϕk(wk; δ) · f˜k(xk; θ)|z
]
= E
[
κ+
K∑
k=1
A−1k ϕk(wk; δ) · fk(x∗k; θ)|z
]
.
The proof of Proposition 1.3.2 follows from the following series of equalities.
E[ϕk(wk; δ) · f˜k(x∗k; θ)|z] = E[ϕk(wk; δ) · f˜k(xkηk; θ)|z] = E[ϕk(wk; δ) · fk(xk; θ) · hk(ηk; θ)|z]
= E[ϕk(wk; δ) · fk(xk; θ) · E[hk(ηk; θ)|wk, xk, z]|z]
= E[ϕk(wk; δ) · fk(xk; θ)|z] · Ak.
The first equality follows by the definition x∗k = xkηk; the second equality follows from
Assumption 1.3.1.2; the third equality follows from the law of iterated expectations; and the
fourth equality follows from Assumption 1.3.1.1. By Assumption 1.3.1.3, Ak is invertible
which gives us the required result.
1.3.2.2 Accounting for measurement errors in the Euler equation The results
in the previous section apply directly to equation (1.3.1). Let true consumption cit be
measured with a multiplicative error η˜it, so that observed consumption is given by c
∗
it = citη˜it,
where η˜it > 0. It is interesting to note that the transformation of the Euler equation
into one that is expressed in terms of growth rates also eliminates individual-specific, time-
invariant measurement errors in consumption. The assumptions on the measurement errors
are therefore presented conditional on these individual-specific effect. Suppose that the
measurement errors can be decomposed as η˜it = µiηit.
Assumption 1.3.3. Given µi and for each t, ηit is independent from time vector of con-
sumption, the taste shifters, the information set, the interest rate, and income.
10
Define g∗it = c
∗
it/c
∗
it−1 and vit = η˜it/η˜it−1 = ηit/ηit−1, so that g
∗
it = gitvit. Assumption
1.3.3 corresponds to Assumption 1.3.1.1. Assumption 1.3.1.2 is satisfied by the structure
of the moment condition in equation (1.3.1). Because ηit > 0, vit > 0 so that Assumption
1.3.1.3 is satisfied by this observation and the structure of equation (1.3.1). Therefore,
under Assumption 1.3.3, the moment condition in equation (1.3.1), which is a function of
unobserved true consumption, is transformed into a moment condition consisting of observed
consumption:
E
[
β(1+rit+1)
ϕit+1
g∗
it+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗α
it
)1−γ(
A−11 −αβA−12 ϕit+2
(
g∗it+2
g∗α
it+1
)1−γ)
−(
1−αβA−13 ϕit+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗α
it
)1−γ)∣∣∣∣∣z∗it] = 0, (1.3.3)
where z∗it is a q-dimensional observable subset of zit that can include current and past interest
rates as well as observable consumption growth up to time t−2. The details of the derivation
are in Appendix A.
It is of interest to evaluate the variation in observed food consumption is due to mea-
surement errors. The variance of measurement errors is not identified without additional
assumptions. To this end, we will make the following functional form assumption as an
alternative specification.
Assumption 1.3.4. Conditioned on µi, measurement errors in consumption are serially
independent and log-normally distributed:
ln ηit|µi ∼ N(0, σ2). (1.3.4)
Under this additional assumption, we have that
A1 = exp{σ2
(
α2(1− γ)2 + γ2 − αγ(1− γ))}
A2 = exp{σ2
(
α2(1− γ)2 + γ2 + (1− γ)(1 + α))}, and
A3 = exp{σ2
(
(1 + α + α2)(1− γ)2)}.
The details of the derivation can are found in Appendix A.
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1.3.3 Identification
This section investigates identification of the parameters from the moment condition in
equation (1.3.3). We first consider identification of the parameters of the model without
imposing Assumption 1.3.4. To this end, let κ1 = A2/A1, κ2 = A2, and κ3 = A2/A3. Then
noting that A2 > 0, equation (1.3.3) can be rewritten as
E
[
β(1 + rit+1)
ϕit+1
g∗it+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗αit
)1−γ (
κ1 − αβϕit+2
(
g∗it+2
g∗αit+1
)1−γ )
−
(
κ2 − αβκ3ϕit+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗αit
)1−γ )∣∣∣∣∣ z∗it
]
= 0, (1.3.5)
Define x∗it+2 =
(
g∗i,t+2, g
∗
i,t+1, g
∗
i,t, ri,t+1, ∆wi,t+2,∆wi,t+1
)
, θ = (α, β, γ, κ′, δ′)′, and ∆2wi,t =
wi,t − wi,t−2. The following conditions are sufficient for the identification of θ.
Assumption 1.3.5. 1. For at least one t in {4, · · · , T}, the conditional density f(x∗i,t|z∗i,t−2)
of x∗i,t given z
∗
i,t−2 is complete.
2. Rank(E[(1, ∆2wi,t)
′(1, ∆2wi,t)]) = Dim((1, ∆2wi,t)′).
3. δ1 = 1.
See Newey and Powell (2003) for discussions of Assumption 1.3.5.1. This completeness
assumption is also used in Chen and Ludvigson (2006) to prove identification of the pa-
rameters characterizing their asset pricing model. The larger is T , the easier it is to find
at least one period for which this condition is satisfied. Assumption 1.3.5.3 is a full rank
assumption. One consequence of this restriction is that a constant cannot be included in
wi,t. Furthermore, a variable that changes by a constant amount, such as age, may not be
included in wi,t. Assumption 1.3.5.3 helps to pin down κ, and δ. More importantly however,
this normalization eliminates the trivial solution. In particular, notice that setting δ = 0,
γ = 1, and αβ = κ1 = κ2/κ3, then the term inside the expectation on the right hand side
of equation (1.3.5) becomes identically zero. Setting δ1 = 1 eliminates this trivial solution.
However, this assumption does require a priori knowledge of the sign of δ1. In the next
section we discuss the choice of wi,t,1. Let θ0 denote the true parameter vector. The proof
of following theorem is presented in Appendix B
12
Theorem 1.3.6. Consider equation (1.3.5) and suppose Assumption 1.3.5 hold. Then θ is
uniquely identified.
The intuition behind the identification of the parameters is as follows. First, the normal-
ization of Assumption 1.3.5.3 eliminates the trivial solution. The completeness assumption,
the continuity of consumption growth, and the differentiability of the second term on the
right hand side of equation (1.3.5) in g∗i,t+2 obtains identification of γ, and α. Given this,
the rank assumption 1.3.5.2 obtains identification of δ and β. Finally, the independent time
variation in the observed consumption process along with the variation in the interest rate
process obtain identification of the κs. This discussion highlights the significance of sufficient
time variation in the consumption process in identifying the parameters of the model.
If in addition Assumption 1.3.4 is imposed, the σ2 is identified from the resulting form of
κ2 = A2. It is important to note that σ2 should be considered a lower bound on the amount
of noise present in observed consumption, since the additional variation contributed by µi is
not contained in σ2.
We can therefore estimate the unknown structural parameters of interest using equation
(1.3.3) as a conditional moment of the form
E
[
ρ(x∗it+1, θo)|z∗it
]
= 0, (1.3.6)
Define the q-dimensional vector mit(θ) := m(x
∗
it+1, z
∗
it, θ) := z
∗′
it ρ(x
∗
it+1, θ) and the correspond-
ing q(T − 4)-dimensional moment vector mi(θ) = m(x∗i , z∗i , θ) := (m′i3(θ), · · · ,m′i,T−2(θ))′
Then equation (1.3.6) implies that
m(θ0) = E[mi(θ0)] = 0. (1.3.7)
Let mˆ(θ) :=
∑N
i=1mi(θ)/N and Ωˆ(θ) :=
∑N
i=1 mi(θ)m
′
i(θ)/N . Then, our estimator for the
parameters of interest is defined by
θˆ = arg min
θ∈Θ
mˆ′(θ)Ωˆ(θ)+mˆ(θ),
where Ωˆ(θ)+ is the generalized inverse of Ωˆ(θ). Two remarks are in order.
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While identification was discussed in terms of conditional moment restrictions, the esti-
mator is defined using unconditional moment restrictions (equation 1.3.7) implied by their
conditional counterparts. This is the dominant approach taken in applied work. However,
in our case, it is important to know if the identification strategy implemented in this paper
using conditional moment restrictions still applies under the unconditional moment restric-
tion. Indeed, if equation (1.3.5) were written in the form of an unconditional moment then
identification of the parameters of the model is maintained if the completeness assumption
is instead imposed on the joint distribution f(x∗i,t, z
∗
i,t−2).
6
As suggested by Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron (1996), we apply continuous updating GMM
(CUGMM) to obtain estimates of the structural parameters. While CUGMM is known
to be somewhat difficult to implement, it has advantages that are pertinent. As stated
by Hansen, Heaton, and Yaron, CUGMM alleviates the problem of weak identification of
parameters that is common in estimating Euler equations. However this doesn’t stop the
estimator from approaching the trivial solution, in which case, our experience indicates that
the estimator becomes unstable. As discussed, we eliminate this instability by imposing the
restriction that the coefficient on lagged income is equal to 1, thus eliminating the choice of
δ = 0. This restriction significantly increases the stability of the estimation algorithm up
to a point where one might be tempted to replace CUGMM with two-step GMM. However,
with approximately 50 moments used in the estimation, CUGMM is also attractive in that
it tends to reduce the bias found in efficient two-step GMM with many moments (see Newey
and Smith 2000).7
6Similar to Chen and Ludvigson (2008), an alternative method of estimating the Euler equation is to
estimate directly the conditional expectations by employing the sieve minimum distance (SMD) technique
(see also Ai and Chen 2003). However, this method is computationally more intensive, and less is known
about testing model validity in the SMD framework.
7Application of one- and two-step GMM estimators to our model confirmed this result, as the estimated
parameters (especially γ) were outside reasonable ranges.
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1.4 MONTE CARLO EXPERIMENT
In this section we investigate the finite sample performance of the estimator developed in
the previous section, as well as the performance of the estimator developed in Dynan (2000).
We do so by conducting a simulation exercise where the life-cycle model presented in Section
1.2 is solved and simulated to obtain a sample of 4000 individuals observed over 24 peri-
ods. The details of the solution and simulation method are outlined in Appendix C. The
structural parameter values of interest are set as follows: γ = 5, α = 0.85, β = 0.95. The
simulated consumption data is contaminated with measurement error drawn independently
over individual and time from a log-normal distribution with variance equal to 20% of the
variation in the simulated consumption.
With the simulated data in hand we investigate the performance of the estimator pro-
posed in Dynan (2000). To derive the estimator, Dynan assumes among other things that:
(i) interest rates do not vary over individuals and time; (ii) individuals live for infinite period,
and (iii) ∆ ln(ct− αct−1) ≈ ∆ ln(ct)− α∆ ln(ct−1). We derive a comparable estimator where
the first two assumptions are maintained. As shown in Mauelbauer (1988), third assumption
requires that consumption does not vary significantly over time. If this and the first two
assumptions are valid, then the estimation of the following equation
∆ ln(c∗it) = β0 + β1∆ ln(c
∗
i,t−1) + β2aget + β3age
2 + t, (1.4.1)
where ∆incomet−1 is used as an instrument for ∆ ln(c∗i,t−1) should yield the result the result
β1 = 0.85. The results from this estimation is presented in Table ??.
The results from Table ?? indicate that estimation of equation (1.4.1) does a poor job
in recovering the habit formation parameter. Indeed the magnitudes of the estimates of the
habit formation parameter are similar to those found in Dynan (2000). These results suggest
that the assumptions made to obtain equation (1.4.1) are substantial.
Table ?? presents the results from implementing the estimator developed in the previous
section using simulated data. Column (1) gives the true values of the “deep” parameters,
15
Table 1.1: Estimation of equation (1.4.1) using the simulated data
(1) (2)
Constant -0.015 5.650
(0.042) (3.562)
∆ ln(c∗i,t−1) 0.077 0.000
(0.005) (0.054)
Age 0.004 -0.051
(0.002) (0.036)
Age2 -0.103 0.625
(0.030) (0.477)
ln(1 + rt) — 137.9
86.58
Instrument set includes current and past income for model (1), and income and lagged interest rates for
model (2). Standard errors in parenthesis.
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Table 1.2: Estimation of the Euler equation with habit formation with simulated dataa
Parameters Truth Log-normal ME Nonparametric ME Ignoring ME
(1) (2) (3) (4)
γ 5.00 5.263 5.016 4.802
(0.324) (2.600) (0.021)
β 0.95 0.926 0.967 0.946
(0.032) (0.017) (0.015)
α 0.85 0.887 0.849 0.785
(0.042) (0.070) (0.006)
σ2 0.06 0.052
(0.003)
a The instrument set includes current and past interest rates and current income. Standard errors in
parenthesis.
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that we try to recover using the proposed estimator. The simulated data set is used to
estimate the model: assuming lognormal measurement error (column (2)), assuming non-
parametric measurement error (column (3)), and finally, ignoring measurement error while
it is present in the data (column (4)).
The results show that both lognormal measurement error model and its non-parametric
counterpart works very well when the true measurement error is lognormal. For these two
estimators all three “deep” parameter estimates are well inside one standard error range
from the truth. Nonparametric measurement error estimator gives larger standard errors
for the estimates. The only concern with the lognormal measurement error estimator is the
variance of measurement errors σ2 that is estimated somewhat lower than the corresponding
truth. The results in column (4) show that both α and γ are estimated with a significant
downward bias. This suggests that while ignoring measurement errors does not affect the
estimation of β, it has the effect of biasing downwards the estimates of the habit formation
parameter α and the curvature parameter γ.
1.5 DATA
Data on food consumption, as well as income and demographic characteristics of individuals
and households are available from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Although
it is the longest panel study, and one of the most comprehensive sources of information for
studying life-cycle processes and poverty and welfare dynamics, its use for studying consump-
tion involves one drawback: consumption data are available only for food. Fortunately, data
on consumption of food as a perishable good are particularly suitable for testing whether
this category of consumption can be habit-forming. The annual frequency of observation is
also advantageous. As argued in Dynan (2000), if there is any effect of durability in food
consumption, it is not likely to last more than a few months.
The main consumption sample that we use consists of data from 1974 through 1987.
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Consumption of households consists of expenditures on food consumed at home, away from
home, and the value of food stamps. Data on food consumed at home and the value of food
stamps are deflated using the consumer price index (CPI) for food at home. Data on food
consumed away from home are deflated using the CPI deflator for food away from home. All
CPI data are taken from the consumer price index releases of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Food consumption data are deflated according to the month and year when the interview
occurred, while food stamps and data on income are deflated using the CPI for the end of
the year before the interview was conducted. In addition, total consumption expenditures
are adjusted by the size of household.
We exclude households whose marital status changed or whose head was younger than
22 or older than 65 over the period of estimation. We also exclude observations for which
the consumption growth rate was higher than 300% and lower than 33%. It is likely that the
extreme outliers in consumption growth rate that we observe in the untrimmed data are due
to measurement errors. Thus, the estimated magnitude of the variance of the measurement
errors in consumption is to be considered a lower bound after this data trimming. Household
characteristics used in estimation as taste shifters include past income, family size and age
of the head of household.
As in Shapiro (1984), Runkle (1991), and similar studies, we construct the household-
specific real after-tax interest rate as ri,t+1 = Rt(1 − τi,t+1) − pit+1, where Rt is the average
12-month Treasury bill for the first half of the preceding year, τi,t+1 is the household marginal
tax rate as reported in the PSID, and pit+1 is the CPI deflator for the period of the interview.
The estimation of the moment condition (equation 1.3.5) and of most of its modifications
for robustness checks requires data on consumption expenditures for four consecutive years
for each orthogonality condition. With the restrictions on data described above, we have an
unbalanced panel on 3,402 households covering ten years from 1976 through 1985. This is
the baseline sample. We also check the sensitivity of the results to the liquidity constraint
assumed in the derivation of the estimator. Therefore, another sample is constructed to
exclude households that may be liquidity constrained during the sample period. In this
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smaller sample of 1,752 households, we keep only the households that report positive savings
over the sample period.
1.6 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
In this section we address several issues while discussing the results obtained from the estima-
tion. The main conclusion from the results are that (i) habit formation plays an important
role in explaining household food consumption patterns; and (ii) mis-specifying the distri-
bution of, or not accounting for measurement errors in observed consumption result in a
downward bias in the estimates of the habit formation and utility curvature parameters.
Table 1.3 presents the parameter estimates. The results from estimating the model
without distributional assumptions on measurement errors are presented in columns (1)-
(4). Column (1) shows results for the basic model estimated with the full sample, while
column (3) reports the results for the same model estimated with the subsample of liquidity-
unconstrained households. Column (2) shows the results for the model augmented with
the aggregate shocks. Column (4) reports the results for the model extended to allow for
external habits. Columns (5)-(7) present the estimation results under the assumption that
measurement errors in consumption are log-normally distributed. Again, column (5) shows
results for the model estimated with the full sample, column (7) reports the results for the
same model estimated with the subsample of liquidity unconstrained households and column
(6) shows the results for the model estimated with the full sample and augmented with the
aggregate shocks. Column (8) reports the results for the model that ignores the existence
of measurement errors. Demographic characteristics as taste shifters are included in all
of the specifications that we consider. A more detailed version of Table 1.3 can be found
in the appendix of the paper. In all specifications, except where measurement errors are
ignored, the J test fails to reject the model at the 5% level of significance, indicating that
not accounting for the measurement errors results in a significant model misspecification.
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Table 1.3: Estimation of the Euler equation with habit formation1
Nonparametric ME Log-normal ME No ME
Parameters Internal habit External habit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
γ 5.279 5.089 4.950 6.024 6.899 3.522 3.029 3.126
(0.057) (0.107) (0.099) (0.071) (2.460) (0.662) (0.366) (0.368)
β 0.987 0.973 0.929 0.983 0.955 0.897 0.956 0.801
(0.068) (0.013) (0.043) (0.025) (0.023) (0.049) (0.030) (0.170)
α 0.831 0.801 0.807 0.800 0.780 0.573 0.799 0.585
(0.016) (0.028) (0.028) (0.011) (0.092) (0.128) (0.115) (0.252)
a 0.473
(0.014)
σ2 0.042 0.072 0.036
(0.012) (0.008) (0.002)
% noise 35 45 32
Some savings yes yes
Aggregate shocks yes yes
J statistic 29.1 23.0 25.6 31.4 33.5 23.2 30.6 619.0
p value 0.933 0.902 0.978 0.858 0.873 0.936 0.936 0.000
N 3,402 3,402 1,754 3,402 3,402 3,402 1,754 3,402
1 Number of time periods T = 10. Standard errors in parenthesis.
2 A blank response in this row indicates that the full sample is used in estimation.
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1.6.1 Habit formation
As discussed in Section 2, habit formation exists in the multiplicative model if γ > 1 and
α > 0, where α measures the strength of habit formation. In all specifications, γ is estimated
to be significantly greater than 1 and α is estimated to be significantly greater than 0.
Thus the estimation results support the existence of habit formation in individual food
consumption.
In the specifications where measurement errors are nonparametrically accounted for, the
estimates of α are precise and found to be between 0.80 and 0.83, indicating significant
strength in habits. Restricting the distribution of measurement errors to the log-normal
family results in point estimates of α between 0.57 and 0.80. This suggests that the as-
sumption of a lognormal distribution for measurement errors is likely a misspecification that
results in a downward bias in the estimate of α. Furthermore, when measurement errors
in consumption are not accounted for, the estimate of α fall to 0.59, suggesting that ig-
noring measurement errors in food consumption results in a significant downward bias in
the estimate of the strength of habit. Notice that the same conclusion was drawn from the
simulation exercise.
The results indicate that allowing for aggregate expectations errors or restricting the
sample to families that are not liquidity constrained does not significantly affect the estimates
of the strength of habit.
The basic model is specified to be consistent only with habit being internal to the in-
dividual. As an extension of this basic model, we allow for external habits in individual
consumption by augmenting the definition of consumption services as follows:
c˜it =
cit
cαit−1C
a
it−1
,
where Cit is period t average consumption of households that belong to income group that
household i belongs to, and 0 ≤ a ≤ 1 measures the strength of external habits. Aggregate
consumption is constructed for 4 different income groups with roughly the same number of
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households in each of them. We assume that measurement errors in aggregate consumption
C are averaged out. Then the external habit counterpart of equation (1.3.5) is:
E
[
β(1 + rit+1)
ϕit+1
g∗it+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗αit G
a
it
)1−γ (
κ1 − αβϕit+2
(
g∗it+2
g∗αit+1G
a
it+1
)1−γ )
−
(
κ2 − αβκ3ϕit+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗αit G
a
it
)1−γ )∣∣∣∣∣ z∗it
]
= 0,
where Git = Cit/Cit−1.
The estimation result is reported in column (4) and indicates that, in addition to internal
habits, external habits are significant in explaining household food consumption patterns.
However, the strength of external habit is significantly smaller that the strength of internal
habit, with a estimated to be 0.47 while α is estimated to be 0.80. Therefore, while internal
habit formation has the dominant effect, external habit formation also plays an important
role in explaining consumption patterns.
Meghir and Weber (1996) suggests that the finding of habit formation in food consump-
tion may be explained by nonseparabilites in preferences over food and other consumption
goods. Carrasco at al.(2005) find that this result of Meghir and Weber is largely due the
presence of time invariant unobserved heterogeneity that Meghir and Weber were unable to
control for due to the small length of the panel used in their estimation. Our estimation
method does control for time invariant heterogeneity. Furthermore, if nonseparabilites in
preferences over food and other consumption goods represents a significant misspecification
in our model, then it is likely that the J test would reject our preferred specifications, as it
rejects the specification that ignores measurement errors.
1.6.2 Utility curvature
The estimates of the utility curvature parameter, γ, after accounting for measurement errors
nonparametrically are found to be between 4.95 and 5.28 for the model with only internal
habits. In the model where external habit are also accounted for, γ is estimated to be 6.02.
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This latter estimate is similar to Fuhrer (2000), who assumed external habits and estimated
γ to be 6.11. These parameters are estimated precisely.
When the distribution of measurement errors is restricted to be log-normal, the esti-
mates of γ become less precise, ranging between 3.03 (with standard error of 0.37) to 6.90
(with standard error of 2.46) Not accounting for measurement errors results in a significant
downward bias in the estimate of γ, falling to 3.13. This is intuitive, as we would expect
a smaller utility curvature parameter with more volatile consumption. By accounting for
measurement errors, we control for the excess noise in the observed consumption series.
1.6.3 Discount factor
The discount factor is estimated precisely to be between 0.90 and 0.99 in all specifications
except when measurement errors are ignored. Not accounting for measurement errors results
in lower and less precise point estimate for the discount factor, falling to 0.8.
1.7 INTERTEMPORAL ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION AND RISK
AVERSION
In this section, we analyze the intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) and the relative
risk aversion (RRA) that is implied by the estimates obtained in the previous section. In
the presence of habit formation, the IES and the RRA varies across individual and time.
Specifically, Appendixes D and E show that the inverse IES and the RRA take the following
form:
1
IESit
= γ −
αβ(1− γ)ϕit+1
(
git+1
gαit
)1−γ
1− αβϕit+1
(
git+1
gαit
)1−γ − α2β(1− γ)ϕit+2
(
git+2
gαit+1
)1−γ
1− αβϕit+2
(
git+2
gαit+1
)1−γ , (1.7.1)
RRAit =
γ − αβϕit+1
(
git+1
gαit
)1−γ
− α2β(1− γ)ϕit+1
(
git+1
gαit
)1−γ
1− αβϕit+1
(
git+1
gαit
)1−γ . (1.7.2)
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Three important facts about IES and RRA are made clear by observing equations (1.7.1)
and (1.7.2). First, the inverse IES and the RRA are higher for habit forming consumers than
for non-habit forming consumers. Second, the habit formation model implies heterogenous
IES and RRA. Recent studies that allow for heterogeneity in risk aversion find significant
variation in aversion to risk across different groups of individuals. Third, the habit formation
model breaks the tight inverse relationship between the IES and the RRA of iso-elastic
specification of preferences. These observations imply that the habit formation model is able
to explain varying IES and RRA across groups of individuals in ways that the iso-elasticity
models cannot.
Because true consumption is not observed, the IES and RRA are generally not observed.
Furthermore, the conditional expectation of the inverse IES and the RRA do not conform to
the transformation employed to derive the estimator because their functional forms do not
satisfy the conditions used to separate true consumption from measurement errors. There-
fore, the expectation of the (inverse) IES and the RRA are in general not directly recoverable
from equations (1.7.1) and (1.7.2). However, it is possible to construct bounds for the con-
ditional expectation of these quantities given the set of instruments z. The proof of the
following proposition is given in Appendix D.
Proposition 1.7.1. Suppose Assumption 1.3.3 holds. Then
1
γ
≥ E [IESit|zit] ≥
(
γ − (1− γ)∑∞j=1E
[(
A−13 αβϕit+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗αit
)1−γ)j
|zit
]
−α(1− γ)∑∞j=1E
[(
A−13 αβϕit+2
(
g∗it+2
g∗αit+1
)1−γ)j
|zit
])−1
,
and
γ ≤ E [RRAit|zit] ≤ γ − (1 + α)(1− γ)
∞∑
j=1
E
(A−13 αβϕit+1(g∗it+1g∗αit
)1−γ)j
|zit
 ,
with strict inequalities if α > 0, β > 0 and γ > 1.
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Proposition 1.7.1 can be used to construct bounds for the unconditional expectation of
the IES and the RRA.
As shown in the next proposition, the assumption that measurement errors are indepen-
dent and log-normally distributed results in point identification of the expectation of the
RRA. However, the expectation of the IES is still only partially identified, but typically with
narrowed bounds relative to the more general case above.
Proposition 1.7.2. Suppose Assumptions 1.3.3 and 1.3.4 hold. Then
1
γ
≥ E [IESit|zit] ≥
(
γ − (1− γ)∑∞j=1 E
[
A−j23
(
αβϕit+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗αit
)1−γ)j
|zit
]
−α(1− γ)∑∞j=1 E
[
A−j23
(
αβϕit+2
(
g∗it+2
g∗αit+1
)1−γ)j
|zit
])−1
,
with strict inequalities if α > 0, β > 0 and γ > 1, and
E [RRAit|zit] = γ − (1 + α)(1− γ)
∞∑
j=1
E
A−j23
(
αβϕit+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗αit
)1−γ)j
|zit
 ,
where A3 = exp{σ2 ((1 + α + α2)(1− γ)2)}.
To see that the bounds on E [IESit|zit] defined in Proposition 1.7.1 are typically wider
than the one defined in Proposition 1.7.2 under the independent log-normal assumption,
notice that A3 > 1 so that j > 1, Aj23 > Aj3. Each additional term in the infinite sums in
Proposition 1.7.2 is smaller than the corresponding term in Proposition 1.7.1.
Given the parameter estimates of the model, the bounds on the IES and the RRA can
be approximated with high precision by replacing the infinite sum with a finite approxima-
tion. Consistency of these estimators of the bounds would depend on allowing the order of
approximation to increase with the sample size. The results of Ai and Chen (2003) can be
used to prove this consistency conjecture. However, this is beyond the scope of the current
paper and is left to future work. With this in hand, asymptotically valid confidence sets can
be defined for these bounds. Construction of these confidence sets are found in Horowitz
and Manski (2000) and Imbens and Manski (2004).
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Table 1.4: 95% confidence intervals for the IES, inverse IES and RRA
Computed using the parameter estimates in Table 1.3, column:
(1) (2) (3) (4)
IES [0.086, 0.189] [0.086, 0.197] [0.084, 0.202] [0.080, 0.166]
RRA [5.167, 13.093] [4.879, 13.020] [4.756, 13.021] [5.885, 13.074]
Table 1.4 presents 95% confidence intervals for the expectation of the IES and the RRA
with estimated parameters taken from selected specifications in Table 1.3. To estimate the
bounds involving infinite sums, a fifth-order approximation of the infinite sum is used. 20
bootstrap draws from the estimated asymptotic distribution of the estimated parameters
are used to compute the standard error of these bounds. The columns of Table 1.4 are
labeled (1), (2), (3) and (4) to correspond to the columns of Table 1.3, that it, the resulting
parameter estimates from estimation of the model with non-parametric measurement errors
.
The estimated bounds for the IES support typical findings in the literature on estimation
of wealth and consumption models. In the habit formation framework Naik and Moore (1996)
report the IES close to our estimates. Similar range for the IES is found over households
or certain cohorts of individuals (see Barsky, Juster, Kimball and Shapiro (1997)). However
larger values of the IES are also reported in the literature.8. It is important to note that as
we investigate household food consumption, the estimated bounds for the IES seem to be
8See, for example, Attanasio and Weber (1993), Atkeson and Ogaki (1996), Vissing-Jorgensen (2002)
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reasonable: the consumption of food is likely to be rather inelastic.
The presented bounds on the RRA suggest that the estimates for this parameter are
somewhat higher than the prevalent estimates in the range between 1 and 4 in empirical
studies of consumption models with no habit formation. Although, recent developments in
empirical estimates of risk aversion suggest that this parameter as high as between 4 and 16
can be found if one accounts for individual heterogeneity in risk aversion.9
To investigate the existence and significance of heterogeneity in the IES and the RRA,
we regress the calculated individual-time specific IES and RRA on a set of regressors. The
caveat in this regression analysis is that observed consumption instead of true consumption
is used to compute the individual-time specific IES and RRA. Because observed consump-
tion is contaminated with measurement errors it is possible that the estimated coefficients
are biased. As is well known, if the dependent variable in a linear regression model is con-
taminated with an additive measurement error component, the coefficients are still unbiased
and consistent under standard assumptions. However, in our cases, the dependent variable
is contaminated by measurement errors in a nonlinear way. Therefore, the above argument
does not carry over to our framework and we should expect that the coefficients estimates
from linear regression will be biased. It is therefore important to understand the direction of
potential bias introduced by measurement errors in observed consumption. The additional
noise introduced to the dependent variable is independent of the other variables in the re-
gression function so the expected effect of this additional noise is that it biases the estimated
coefficients towards zero. Therefore, the regression results should be interpreted as being
biased against detecting statistically significant explainable heterogeneity in the IES and the
RRA.
Table 1.5 reports the results from the regression of observed IES and RRA on a constant,
lagged income, lagged income squared, a dummy for high school graduate (HG), a dummy
for college graduate (CG), age, and age squared. Observed IES and RRA are computed
using the estimated parameters from columns (1) - (4) of Table 1.3 and the columns labelled
9Alan and Browning (2010) provide a discussion on the recent literature and show the estimation results
supporting this range of the risk aversion parameter.
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Table 1.5: Regression of estimated RRA and IES on income and age
RRA IES
Parameter estimates in Table 1.3, column: Parameter estimates in Table 1.3, column:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 5.840 6.550 8.043 9.331 0.112 0.112 0.107 0.095
(1.789) (1.613) (1.958) (2.063) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007)
Incomet−1 -0.597 -1.062 -2.341 -1.996 -0.001 0.001 0.008 0.005
(0.765) (0.696) (0.840) (0.881) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Aget 0.373 0.323 0.248 0.290 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.089) (0.080) (0.097) (0.102) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0003)
Age2t -0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001
(0.001) (0.0009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000004) (0.000004) (0.000005) (0.000004)
R2 0.0053 0.0044 0.0046 0.0036 0.0046 0.0033 0.0029 0.0033
(1), (2), (3), and (4) of Table 1.5 correspond to the columns of Table 1.3.
The regression results indicate that the IES is increasing and convex in both age and
income, while the RRA is decreasing and concave in both age and income. These results are
consistent across the different specifications. However, while the effect of age on the IES and
the RRA is monotonic throughout the sample, the effect of income on the IES is U shaped
with a turning point at approximately $41,000 for columns (1), (2), and (4), and $35,000 for
column (3). Also, the effect of income on the RRA is dome shaped with turning point at
approximately $36,000 for columns (1), (2), and (4), and $34,000 for column (3). The results
also display modest evidence that the RRA is increasing in the education of the head of the
household. However, we do not find that education is a significant determinant of the IES.
In terms of individual actions, the results are interpreted as follows. Given income and
education, the intertemporal allocation of food consumption by households with older heads
is less responsive to intertemporal changes in food prices. Also, given income and education,
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households with older heads are more likely to dedicate a larger percentage of their income
to precautionary savings than their younger counterparts. Because the PSID contains the
full age profile of interest (ages 22 - 65) in each wave, these results cannot be attributed
to cohort effects. Among the other studies that investigate the effect of age on the IES or
the RRA, very few recover significant patterns. However, Eisenhauer and Ventura (2003) do
find similar increasing and concave patterns of the RRA in age.
Given education and age, households with moderate income (roughly between $30,000
and $40,000) are less responsive to intertemporal changes in food prices, and are more likely
to save for precautionary motives. We are not aware of other studies that recover these
nonlinear patterns of the IES and RRA with respect to income. In the work of Guiso and
Piaella (2001) and Eisenhauer and Ventura (2003) there is some evidence that the RRA is
increasing in income. However, these studies do not consider higher order effects of income
on the RRA.
The results in Table 1.5 provides modest evidence that the RRA is increasing in the level
of education of the head of the household. As expected, these coefficients are larger and more
significant when income is omitted from the regression. Allan and Browning (2010) also find
that less educated households tend to be less risk averse using a different estimation strategy.
Given the iso-elastic preferences assumption of their model, Allan and Browing (2010) also
interpreted their result as indicating that more educated households are more prudent. In our
framework, the tight link between risk aversion and prudence is broken by habit formation.
Thus, this conclusion cannot be extended to our framework.
It is worth reiterating that the results concerning heterogeneity of the IES and the RRA
should be interpreted with the qualification that the observed IES and RRA are contaminated
with measurement errors in a nonlinear way. Under the assumption that measurement
errors are independent of income, education, and age, the result is that the additional noise
introduced reduces the explanatory power of these variables. The results that are consistent
and precisely estimated across the considered specifications are that: the IES is decreasing
and convex in age; the RRA is increasing and concave in age; the IES depicts a U shape in
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income; and the RRA depicts a dome shape in income. The other result that is consistent
across specifications, but less precisely estimated is that the RRA is higher for households
with more educated heads.
1.8 CONCLUSION
Habit formation in preferences have been used to explain a wide variety of macroeconomic
phenomena. However, at the level of micro data, the evidence of habit formation in con-
sumption is mixed. Previous micro studies that investigate habit formation using standard
preferences impose arguably strong assumptions in order to obtain an estimating equation.
The misspecifications that are due to these assumptions are likely to result in significant
biases in the estimates. This intuition is confirmed in our simulation exercise. This paper
develops a new exact nonlinear GMM estimator that account for measurement errors with-
out the need for these assumptions. As a result of estimation, we find that habit formation
is an important determinant of food consumption patterns.
Another advantage of the method developed in this paper is that, to the best of our
knowledge, it is the first Euler equation GMM method that allows for the analysis of indi-
vidual heterogeneity in two key economic parameters, the IES and the RRA. Other methods
that analyze heterogeneity in these parameters do so either in experimental frameworks, sur-
vey studies, or by methods where the expectations errors are parametrically specified. The
method presented here allows for comparable analysis using nationally representative data
set such as the PSID, and without the need to specify the distribution of the measurement
errors.
There are some extensions to the model presented in this paper that can be pursued
in future work. One such consideration is to extend the model to allow for more flexible
patterns of habit formation. In this paper, we extended the baseline internal habit formation
model to allow for external habit. Another possibility is to allow for more general model
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specifications of internal habits. The current model assumes that internal habit is a function
of only the last period consumption. The model and estimation method can be extended
to include additional lags, but at the cost of a smaller number of time periods in which to
recover parameters that dictate consumption patterns. Another potentially fruitful direction
for future work is to estimate the parameters of the model using consumption goods and
services other than food consumption. One would then be able to test if the implied IES
and RRA vary across these consumption groups.
That being said, this paper proposes a direct GMM estimator of Euler equations with
nonseparabilities, which can also be used to investigate individual heterogeneity in the IES
and RRA. We find that the IES is decreasing and convex in age, and that the RRA is
increasing and concave in age, and increasing in education. These findings are consistent
with those of other recent studies. The new findings are that the IES is U shaped in income
and the RRA is dome shaped in income. These findings warrant further analysis because of,
among other things, their implications for idiosyncratic consumption and savings responses
to various economic policy interventions such as interest rate taxation and fiscal policies.
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2.0 DYNAMIC STOCK MARKET PARTICIPATION OF HOUSEHOLDS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade the limited stock market participation phenomenon has received grow-
ing attention in empirical and theoretical work. Despite the theoretical prediction that all
investors will participate in stock markets if the equity premium is positive, empirical ev-
idence shows that a substantial fraction of consumers do not participate in stock markets
either directly or indirectly (via mutual funds and similar institutions). One of the leading
explanations to the phenomenon is that it is costly to invest in stocks, and these costs arise
from investor’s inertia, time and effort that consumers have to spend to obtain and process
financial knowledge and information, follow the situation on financial markets, pay sign-up
fees and file the necessary paperwork.
The profile of an average stock holder differs from the one of a non-participant in that
the former is older and more educated. It is also shown that stockholders are more educated
financially. Apparently, one of the ways to increase stock market participation is to provide
financial education to consumers who are not aware about all financial products available.
The importance of promotion of financial education was acknowledged a decade ago with
launching financial education curricula via a number of economic policy incentives.1 Further,
the issue of limited stock market participation was reinforced by a growing concern in the lit-
erature and in economic policy debates (see Lusardi, van Rooji and Alessie (2007) and Guiso
1Examples are The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, and Money Smart, a program
that is launched by The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
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and Japelli (2005)). These debates resulted in a number of financial education programs that
are designed to further increase and promote financial literacy among consumers.2
The objective of the paper is to investigate whether the financial education programs
can influence consumers’ financial choices and increase participation in financial markets.
I use micro data to estimate a dynamic model of stock market participation, where con-
sumers’ decisions regarding stock market participation are influenced by participation costs.
Participation costs serve as a channel, through which the financial education programs can
affect the consumers’ investment decisions. Financial education and counseling alleviates
the burden of consumers’ time and effort needed to make financial decisions and reduces
the participation costs.3 I show that participation costs are influenced by past stock market
participation experience and by consumers’ age.
Stock market participation costs are not observed by researchers, which comprises the
major difficulty in estimating it. Empirical studies of Paiella (1999), Vissing-Jorgensson
(2002) and Andersen and Nielsen (2011) provide evidence that small fixed participation costs
have a potential to explain the observed low stock market participation rate. In theoretical
simulations Haliassos and Michaelides (2003) and Gomes and Michaelides (2003) show that
the non-participation in stock markets can be rationalized by existence of an entry cost
or participation cost. However, there is no agreement in the literature on how large these
participation costs may be. Also, there is a distinction in the literature between per period
participation costs and fixed entry costs. Empirical studies estimate the former, while the
latter is calibrated in theoretical simulations of investor’s life cycle paths.
The up to date empirical estimates of per period fixed participation costs can only provide
the lower bound and suggest that the true (unobserved) participation cost exceeds these levels
in reality. Attanasio and Paiella (2011) and Paiella (2007) estimate the lower bound to the
forgone gains of holding an incomplete portfolio in units of non-durable consumption as low
2The latest incentive is The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010.
3Consumers do not necessarily need to go to financial consultants in order to receive financial advice. One
of the ways to increase one’s financial awareness is through the interaction with co-workers and neighbors.
As an example, Duflo and Saez (2000) and Hong, Kubik and Stein (2004) provide evidence on peer effect as
a determinant for participation.
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as 0.4% and 0.7-3.3% of consumption per year.4 On the other hand, theoretical simulations
of stock market entry cost calibrate it as a fixed share of expected annual income. Haliassos
and Michaelides (2003) obtain a wide range for entry costs from 3% to 34% of mean annual
income. Alan (2006) finds stock market entry cost about 2% of annual permanent income.
I consider these studies as a guidance on the possible magnitudes of participation costs and
take one step further to explore the heterogeneity in it. Further, I show how participation
costs change as a consumer (a household in my study) grows older, obtains stock market
participation experience and finally, receives educational services that may affect his financial
literacy and awareness.
In developing the model I relate to a literature that focuses on the determinants of
heterogeneity in stock market participation and portfolio choice. Bertaut and Starr-McCluer
(2002), Guiso and Japelli (2002), Banks and Tanner (2002), and Brunnermeier and Nagel
(2008) provide evidence that wealth, age and education are important factors that affect
risky asset investment decisions. The choice and intensity of stock market participation
are also affected by past participation and investment choices as well as expectations of
the future returns. Likewise, the portfolio choice is not independent from past investment
choices. This dynamic dependence is confirmed empirically by Alessie, Hochguertel, and van
Soest, 2002, 2004, and Munoz (2006) among others. Similar to this strand of literature, I
allow for controlling for observed heterogeneity represented by investor’s wealth, age and
education. However, econometric framework distinguishes this paper from above empirical
studies: the estimated model is fully structural and allows for endogenous investment choices
both in the participation decision and the share of wealth invested in stocks.
The estimation results provide evidence that the participation cost, measured as a share
of income can be substantial. The average stock market participation cost is estimated to
be about 5% of labor income. However, it is not constant over the life cycle. The results
show that the participation cost is decreasing with education and age. When age is allowed
4These estimates translate into $72 bound for Attanasio and Paiella (2011) and $130 bound for Paiella
(2007). Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) finds that per period fixed cost as low as $260 can explain the behavior of
majority of nonparticipants.
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to enter participation cost in a quadratic form, participation cost becomes increasing in
concave in age, with the turning point around age 35-40. Participation cost is smaller for
consumers who invested in stock market in the past. The model estimates are used to
conduct simulation exercises to investigate how the participation decision is affected when
consumers are provided financial consulting. Their participation rate is greater compared to
that of baseline consumers.
2.2 THE MICROECONOMIC PICTURE: DATA AND DISCUSSION
2.2.1 Data
The analysis of direct stock market participation is a part of a bigger problem of investment
in risky assets. Diversification of extended financial portfolio, which includes other risky
assets (e.g. investment in business or farm), may drive households away from direct stock
market participation. In addition, changes in housing can provide another reason to withdraw
savings from stock markets. Finally, deep changes in family composition (for example, new
head of household) can influence changes in household portfolio. These factors are important
and deserve to be explored in detail on their own. However, in the current study I exclude
the influence of these factors, and consider households that satisfy the following restrictions:
(i) do not invest in business and / or farm; (ii) do not experience changes in housing; (iii)
have the same head of household for the whole observation period.
Data on household liquid wealth, income and demographic characteristics are taken from
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Wealth supplement of the PSID is available
every 5 years between 1984 and 1999. After 1999 the data become available every other
year. In my analysis I use the later data starting from 1999 through 2007. Table 2.1 shows
summary statistics for the data that I use in my analysis.
Wealth and Income
The value of households’ stock holdings is observed in the PSID as “non-IRA stock
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holdings”.5 Total liquid wealth is computed as a sum of non-IRA stock holdings, money in
checking or savings accounts, money market funds, certificates of deposit, government savings
bonds, or Treasury bills, bond holdings and money in other savings or assets, such as bond
funds. The value of liquid wealth that in not invested in stocks is considered as a risk-free
asset. Total household income consists of labor income, financial income (interest, dividends,
income from trust fund) and other money inflow (child support, help from relatives, rent,
worker’s compensation) of head of household and the spouse. Top coded observations on
wealth and income are excluded from the sample. I also remove extreme outliers by excluding
observations for wealth and income at 99-percentile from above and 1-percentile from below.
Data on income and wealth are deflated using the CPI for the end of the year before the
interview was conducted. CPI deflator is taken from the consumer price index releases of
the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Table 2.1 shows that the difference in both income and wealth between participants and
non-participants is dramatic. On average non-participants have lower income. The accumu-
lated wealth of nonparticipants is substantially lower as well. However larger average income
and wealth of stock market participants are accompanied by larger standard deviations.
Demographics
Demographic characteristics include age, education and occupation of the head of house-
hold, as well as marital status and family size. Individual consumption and savings behavior
differs depending on in what stage of life a consumer finds himself: prime working age or re-
tirement. This study mostly considers prime age consumers and excludes households whose
head is younger than 22 or older than 65 over the period of estimation. I exclude households
whose marital status changed over the sample period.
Table 2.1 shows that there are differences in demographic characteristics of participants
and non-participants. On average, stock market participants are 2-3 years older and more
educated. Their occupation is on average more related to management, business operation
5The PSID separately provides information on total amount held in individual retirement accounts and
an approximate split of the amount in IRA between interest- and dividend-earning assets. However, the
exact value of IRA in stock holdings is not available.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
Year 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
Observations 1,332 1,424 1,382 1,481 1,524
Income and Wealtha
Income 39,420.6 39,532.9 38,748.0 40,040.0 40,252.8
Non-participants 34,716.9 35,363.8 35,698.1 36,913.2 36,965.0
(19,885.0) (21,087.4) (21,198.6) (22,709.3) (22,290.0)
Participants 50,740.6 50,243.1 46,938.1 49,565.4 51,530.6
(29,623.8) (27,695.0) (29,134.3) (30,019.2) (29,623.2)
Wealth 21,525.4 21,974.9 23,793.2 22,864.0 21,859.5
Non-participants 10,407.1 10,725.3 11,440.3 10,338.6 10,532.2
(23,649.3) (25,346.4) (27,277.2) (22,870.9) (25,020.8)
Participants 48,283.5 50,874.2 56,965.1 61,022.1 60,714.7
(58,981.7) (64,580.2) (71,231.2) (74,778.4) (71,578.9)
Stock holders 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.25 0.22
Share of wealth in stock 0.61 0.58 0.53 0.55 0.57
Stock holdings of participants 32,883.1 32,979.9 32,451.9 37,838.5 37,270.7
Demographic data
Age 43.3 44.3 45.1 46.1 46.0
Non-participants 42.6 43.7 44.6 45.4 45.4
Participants 44.8 46.0 46.5 48.3 48.0
Family size 3.03 3.00 2.93 2.94 2.89
Non-participants 3.10 3.02 2.97 2.99 2.92
Participants 2.87 2.94 2.82 2.80 2.78
Education 13.7 13.6 13.6 13.7 13.7
Non-participants 13.3 13.3 13.3 13.4 13.4
Participants 14.6 14.6 14.5 14.6 14.7
Marital status 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.71
Non-participants 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.68
Participants 0.74 0.78 0.76 0.79 0.79
Occupationb n.a. n.a. 0.16 0.17 0.16
Non-participants 0.13 0.15 0.14
Participants 0.23 0.23 0.26
aStandard deviation is reported in parenthesis.
bEquals to 1 if related to management, business operation or financial specialist; 0 otherwise.
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or financial specialist. There are more married individuals among stock market participants
compared to non-participants. The difference in family composition is not substantial.
Rates of Return
The uncertainty about returns on risky assets plays an important role in the dynamic
decisions about participation and portfolio composition. Additional information is needed to
assess the realizations of the household-specific rates of return on stock holdings and risk-free
assets.
The PSID provides data not only on the value of stock holdings, but also the amount that
was invested in or taken out of stocks between periods t−1 and t. Then the household specific
rate of return on stock holdings Rsit can be computed using the household data on total value
of stock holdings and sales (purchases) of stocks from the constraint Sit = sit + R
s
itSit−1
where Sit is the total value of stock held by household i, sit is the value of purchases or
sales of stock between periods t− 1 and t for household i. Unfortunately, the data in wealth
supplement of the PSID are known to suffer from systematic underreporting of trades. The
“forgotten” trades affect the computed idiosyncratic rates of return and often make them
either unrealistically large or small. This caveat makes using the computed Rsit as a rate of
return on household’s stock holdings problematic. However, I still use the information on the
computed Rsit to construct an indicator on whether a household received a high, moderate
or low return on stock holdings in the current period, conditional on the participation in
the previous period. I construct the indicator for high, moderate or low rate of return by
matching the household specific rate of return on stock holdings Rsit with the distribution of
the market index rate for the period. I use SP500 as such index. The real risk-free rate Rft
is constructed based on seasonally adjusted deflated average 6-month Treasury bill.
The summary statistics for the risk-free rate and rates of return on stock holdings are
reported in Table 2.2. The time period that is considered in the paper can be characterized
as years of turbulence in financial markets. It is reflected in the rates of return on market
indices that vary substantially over the reported period. In spite of the deficiencies in the
reported stock holdings, the median for the computed household-specific rate of return Rs
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admits reasonable values and follows the trend of market indices.6 One can see that there
are two ”regimes” in the empirical distribution of the computed rates of return. Over time
period from 1999 to 2002 smaller values of returns were prevalent. These years were most
affected by financial markets turbulence over the observed period. In 2003 to 2007 small,
medium and large returns showed similar weights. This is consistent with the period of
stability in financial markets.
Data Sets Used in Estimation
For the analysis that follows I take into account the data restriction discussed above and
construct 3 data samples: data sample used in estimation of the main model; data sample
with extended time frame for estimation of the earnings’ equation and data sample with
extended number of individuals to estimate the conditional choice probabilities.
The first stage of analysis involves the estimation of the individual effects. To reduce the
bias in individual effects one needs a data sample with larger time dimension. Individual fixed
effects are estimated using the earnings’ equation. Unlike the wealth data, labor income is
reported in the PSID in all time periods well beyond the period for which wealth supplement
is available. To estimate the earnings’ equation, I take the extended data set starting from
1979 through 2007. To be consistent with the main model I use data on odd years only
as the main model uses data on odd years as well. Using the age and income restrictions,
described above, I construct the extended data set of 7,744 households that contains data
on household’s labor income, age, education and family size.
The second stage of the analysis estimates conditional choice probabilities that also
require a large number of observations, especially so on the cross section dimension of the
panel. This data set is constructed using wealth variables, among others, therefore has time
dimension from 2001 (accounting for one lag) through 2007. To ensure larger number of
observations, I drop the age and marital status restrictions discussed above. Namely, I use
households of all ages and disregard the changes in marital status while still controlling
for marital status among other family characteristics. The conditioning set includes the
6The average household specific return is not so meaningful due to the substantial number of computed
rates that are either very large or very small, depending on the time period.
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Table 2.2: Rates of return
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Rf 0.020 0.026 0.020 -0.008 -0.008 -0.019 0.000 0.024 0.000
Nasdaq 0.581 -0.246 -0.242 -0.307 0.547 -0.021 0.082 0.056 -0.063
SP500 0.070 -0.044 -0.165 -0.249 0.305 0.016 0.043 0.105 -0.079
Rs∗ -0.029 -0.114 0.067 0.024
FLt 0.428 0.427 0.344 0.318
FMt 0.277 0.283 0.327 0.371
FHt 0.295 0.290 0.329 0.311
∗ Rs is median of ex post annual rate between two consecutive time periods, calculated from the wealth
supplement of the PSID and reported for stock market participants only. Fkt for k = {L,M,H} is the
probability of the individual return of stock Rs be one standard deviation lower,in between, or greater than
the average return on SP500 for the observed time period, calculated from the data. Returns are inflation
adjusted.
41
following covariates: past wealth, past share in wealth invested in stocks, return on household
portfolio, income, age, education, occupation, family size, marital status as well as estimated
individual effects and time dummies from the earnings’ equation. All in total, I have 10,708
observations available over 4 time periods.
Finally, the main sample is used to estimate preference parameters and parameters of
the participation cost. The main data sample is constructed as an unbalanced panel of 299
households observed over 3 periods: 2001, 2003 and 2005. Two other time periods (1999 and
2007) we lost while taking one lag and one lead. These households are observed participating
in stock markets in the current period. Two comments are due to mention. First, while
the main model is estimated with stock market participants, due to the way the estimator
is constructed, the information on non-participants is fully used in the estimation of the
conditional choice probabilities and is, therefore, incorporated into the main sample through
CCP’s. Second, the base of the estimator is an identity equation that holds equally for both
participants and non-participants. Therefore, self selection issue cannot be a problem.
The set of model covariates includes past and current wealth, past and current share of
wealth invested in stocks, current and future income, current demographic characteristics,
as well as the estimates of the conditional choice probabilities and transition probabilities.
Transition probabilities Fkt for k = {L,M,H} are computed from the data as reported in
Table 2.2. The instrument set to form orthogonality conditions include variables from the
state vector: past share of wealth invested in stock, past portfolio allocation, return on
household portfolio, income as well as family characteristics.
2.2.2 Regression Analysis
Table 2.1 shows that the observed characteristics of households in the sample differ signifi-
cantly between stock market investors and non-investors. The difference between participants
and non-participants is especially striking along the dimension of liquid wealth, income, age
and education. In this section I analyze the probability of investing in stocks and the share
of wealth invested in stocks. I estimate Heckman sample selection model to determine the
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Table 2.3: Regressions for stock market participation and share of wealth invested in stocks,
Heckman two-step estimator.
Variable Participation Share
History of participation in the past 1.337∗
(0.050)
Income 0.069∗
(0.026)
0.010
(0.008)
Income2/1000 −2.841
(1.991)
−0.235
(0.570)
Wealtht−1 0.068∗
(0.012)
0.004
(0.004)
Wealth2t−1/1000 −1.244∗∗
(0.486)
−0.007
(0.134)
Age 0.032∗∗∗
(0.019)
0.005
(0.008)
Age2/1000 −0.215
(0.154)
−0.045
(0.061)
Education 0.078∗
(0.011)
0.001
(0.004)
Male 0.040
(0.084)
−0.008
(0.032)
White 0.444∗
(0.065)
−0.007
(0.031)
Married −0.019
(0.039)
−0.042
(0.031)
Family size −0.009
(0.026)
−0.013
(0.015)
Number of children −0.006
(0.047)
0.029
(0.018)
Constant −3.977∗
(0.622)
0.547∗∗∗
(0.294)
Mills −0.047∗∗
(0.021)
*,** and *** denote 1%, 5% and 10% significance level. Regression uses 5107 observations, which includes
1415 uncensored observations. Age cohort dummies, time dummies and region dummies are included in all
regressions. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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covariates that are particularly powerful in explaining the decision to invest in stock markets
and portfolio allocation of stock market participants.
The estimation of the participation equation and the share of wealth in stocks is reported
in Table 2.3. The average participation rate in the sample is 24%. The history of past
participation in stock markets has a dramatic effect on the participation rate, it increases
the probability of current participation by 44%. Participation rate is increasing and concave
in past wealth. It also increases with income. After controlling for age cohorts and time
dummies, the effect of age on the decision to participate is still positive. More educated
households are more likely to participate in stock markets. The probability of participation
in stock markets is substantially greater for households with a white head.
All of the demographic covariates in the outcome equation for the share of wealth invested
in stocks are statistically insignificant. Only constant is estimated marginally significant at
the level of 0.54.
The evidence that age, education and past participation experience have a significant
positive effect on stock market participation may support the existence of information cost to
participation. Education generally proxies for the ability to collect and process information.
Age and past participation can proxy for the accumulation of the information and experience.
Generally, the regression analysis suggests, that participation cost may depend on these
demographic characteristics and is likely to decline in education and age and be smaller for
households that invested in stock markets before.
Participation in stock markets requires not only financial knowledge, but also time effort.
The opportunity cost of participation can be measured as a fixed share of income. Indeed,
the leading measure of the participation cost in the literature is the fixed amount of labor
income (see Gomes and Michaelides (2003) and the subsequent studies). To relate to this
literature I construct participation cost as a share of labor income.
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2.2.3 Discussion
Stock market participation is costly in terms of effort and time spent by individuals to collect
all necessary information and analyze how stock markets function. Gomes and Michaelides
(2003) show that the participation cost have a potential to resolve the discrepancy between
theoretical prediction that all investors participate in stock markets if the equity premium
is positive, and empirical evidence that only a fraction of individuals participate in stock
markets.
Investors face different costs, associated with stock holdings. Part of these costs are the
direct transaction costs that have to be paid to the institution that facilitates the interaction
between individual investors and stock markets. Brokerage fees can be one example of such
costs. On the other hand, in order to enjoy the reward of greater expected return on savings
through holding stocks, investor has to obtain a certain amount of knowledge about stock
markets. The time and effort spend by individual investors to gain the knowledge represent
the opportunity cost of stock market participation. Recent studies show that information
barriers is an impediment to stock market participation. Honk, Kubik and Stein (2003)
show that social interactions help to promote the participation in stock markets. Guiso and
Japelli (2009) argue for the lack of awareness among investors about stock markets as an
option to save. According to Alessie, Lusardi and van Rooij (2010), there is a causal effect
of the lack of financial literacy on stock market participation.
The awareness and financial illiteracy arguments align with the recent developments
in economic and financial policy. Some of the program are designed to regulate financial
institutions, however their effect ultimately have to reach the consumers. The goals of one of
such programs, Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, is to set rules to the institutions
that provide financial advisory services to promote financial literacy and help consumers to
achieve financial independence. As a result, consumers become more informed and more
aware of the impact of financial decisions they make. Another program, Improving Access
to Mainstream Financial Institutions Act is designed to reach low- and medium-income
households through financial education and counseling. This policy is aimed to improve
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access to affordable and responsive financial products and services and plays its important
role helping low-income households to build and maintain assets.
These economic and financial policies are an important step to help achieving the level of
financial independence for individual investors. The economic outcome of these policy pro-
grams is yet to be revealed. However, it is possible to evaluate the potential impact of these
policies through counterfactual simulations. In the following sections I develop the model
of stock market participation, where consumers decisions regarding stock market participa-
tion are influenced by participation costs. Participation costs serve as a channel, through
which the financial education programs can affect the consumers investment decisions. The
model estimates are used to conduct counterfactual simulation exercises to investigate how
the participation decision is affected when consumers are provided financial education and
consulting.
2.3 MODEL
This section develops the theoretical framework to investigate household portfolio choices.
There are N households indexed by i = 1, . . . , N , each with a lifespan of T periods. In
each period, household i observes its accumulated wealth and a current rate of return on
the portfolio composed of riskless and (possibly) risky assets. After household’s income is
received, household observes the amount of cash on hand to be allocated between a single
composite consumption good and savings.7 The household also decides how to reallocate
savings between a risky and riskless asset. In each period the household decides whether to
invest in stocks by choosing dit = 1, or not participate in stock markets and keep all savings
in riskless asset by choosing dit = 0. If the household decides to invest in stocks, then the
share of wealth allocated to stock holdings, represented by αit, is chosen as well.
Let zit be the state vector of household i in period t that is composed of observed and
7I do not model household labor supply decisions and assume that the households supply labor in each
period.
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unobserved characteristics. Let djit for j = 0, 1 be the indicator for participation choices:
d1it = 1 if household invests in stocks in period t, and d0it = 1 if households does not
participate in stock markets, where d0it + d1it = 1. In every period household i receives a
utility payoff uj(zit) that depends on consumption and stock market participation choices.
The current utility payoff from choosing j in time t is also affected by a choice-specific shock
εjit, independent over i and t, which is revealed to the household at the beginning of period
t. In every period t = 1, . . . , T household i chooses portfolio composition that solves the
following problem:
max
dit
Eit
T∑
τ=t
1∑
j=0
βτ−tdjiτ [uj(ziτ ) + εjiτ ] (2.3.1)
subject to: wit = R
p
itwit−1 + yit − cit − ditρit,
where the expectation is taken conditional on the state vector zit, β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective
time-discount factor, y is the households income, c is consumption and w is total liquid
wealth (stocks, bonds, cash accounts and similar liquid assets). Define α, a share of risky
asset in households portfolio as α = S/w, where S is the total value of stock holdings. Rs is
a real return on risky asset held by household and Rf is return on riskless asset, combination
of which gives the return on the portfolio Rpt = αt−1R
s
t + (1− αt−1)Rft . If household decides
to invest in stocks, it gives up a fixed per period participation cost ρ. The problem (2.3.1)
is maximized by a Markov decision rule.
Let V (zit) be the (ex-ante) value function in period t, that corresponds to the optimiza-
tion problem (2.3.1). The value function Vj(zit) conditional on the choice j can be written as
Vj(zit) = vj(zit)+εjit, where vj(zit) is the conditional value function explained by zit and εjit
is a stochastic component that is not observed by an econometrician. Optimal participation
choice involves comparing value functions associated with each choice. The optimal decision
doit of household i in period t can be expressed as follows:
doit ≡
1 if v1(zit) + 1it = v0(zit) + 0it0 otherwise (2.3.2)
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From equation (2.3.2), the conditional probability of participation in stock markets can
be represented as pit = p(zit) = E[doit|zit]. Hotz and Miller (1993) prove the existence of a
mapping where the difference in conditional value functions v1(zit)−v0(zit) can be represented
as a function of conditional probabilities. Under assumption that (0it, 1it) are identically
and independently distributed over (i, t) as Type 1 extreme value random variables, the
optimality condition (2.3.2) can be transformed into the following:
ln
pit
1− pit = v1(zit)− v0(zit). (2.3.3)
The left hand side of (2.3.3) can be estimated directly with the data. The right hand side can
be expressed as a function of current and future utility payoffs. The details on the derivation
of the right hand side of (2.3.3) follow.
Let Aτit denote the set of all possible realizations of the state vector for household i at τ
periods after t given the realization of the state vector zit in period t. If the household takes
action j at time t, then the state vector zit transitions into zit+1 with the probability denoted
as Fj(zit+1|zit). I use the results established in Hotz and Miller (1993) and Arcidiacono and
Miller (2010) to write the conditional value function vj(zit) as follows:
vj(zit) = uj(zit) + β
∑
zit+1∈A1it
Vt+1(zit+1)Fj(zit+1|zit)
= uj(zit) + β
∑
zit+1∈A1it
[v0(zit+1) + ϕ0(pt+1(zit+1))]Fj(zit+1|zit)
= uj(zit) +
T∑
τ=t+1
∑
ziτ∈Aτit
βτ−td0iτ [u0(ziτ ) + ϕ0(pτ (ziτ ))]Fj(zit+1|zit)
τ∏
s=t+2
1∑
k=0
dkisFk(zis|zis−1)
where the first equality establishes that the conditional value function is composed of the
utility payoff of action j and the expected future value conditional on following the optimal
decision rule from period t + 1 on; the second line is written using forward substitution of
the conditional value function and uses another result of Hotz and Miller (1993) that under
assumption that (0it, 1it) are identically and independently distributed over (i, t) as Type
1 extreme value random variables the value function can be expressed as a conditional value
48
function plus a function of the conditional choice probabilities8; the third line uses Theorem
1 in Arcidiacono and Miller (2010) to obtain a recursive representation of the conditional
value function that is now composed of the current and future utility payoffs, functions of
conditional choice probabilities and transition probabilities. The important result from this
representation is that in many cases under selected choice alternatives the conditional value
function exhibits finite dependence, such that only a small number of future time periods
matter beyond the current period. Due to the finite time dependence property the current
decisions affect only a limited number of time periods in the future.9 The model presented
in this paper can satisfy the finite dependence property.
In order to take advantage of finite dependence I limit the analysis to only a small number
of participation strategies that proves sufficient for estimation of the parameters of interest.
Let xit be an L-dimensional vector of exogenous covariates for household i at time t. Income
is treated as exogenous as well as forecastable and is a part of the vector of exogenous
covariates. Define w˜it−1 = R
p
itwit−1 as the period t value of household i’s accumulated
wealth. Then the observed state vector for household i at time t is given by the (L + 2)-
dimensional vector (αit−1,w˜it−1, x
′
it). The information set zit is composed of the observed
state vector, and the (unobserved) individual heterogeneity νi and aggregate shock ωt, so
that zit = (αit−1,w˜it−1, x
′
it,νi,ωt)
′. Then I define a set of histories as (2× 3 +L)-dimensional
vectors a1kit and a0it as:
a0it = (αit−1, 0 , 0 , w˜it−1, w˜it, w˜it+1, x
′
it), (2.3.4)
a1kit = (αit−1, α∗it, 0 , w˜it−1, w˜
k
it, w˜it+1, x
′
it) (2.3.5)
where α∗it is the optimal fraction of wealth a household chooses to invest in stocks, conditional
on participating in stock markets. Under the strategy (2.3.4) a household chooses not to
participate in stock market at date t, and then does not participate in period t+1. Likewise,
under the strategy (2.3.5) a household chooses to participate in stock market at date t, but
8ϕ(pit) = ξ − ln(pit), where ξ ≈ 0.576 is Euler’s constant
9Arcidiacono and Miller (2008) describe in detail how finite time dependence property can be applied to
a broader class of models.
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does not participate in period t+ 1. It is assumed that in period t+ 1 the choice of wealth
held in riskless assets is the same under both strategies. Then beyond time period t + 1
the terms in conditional value function become not consequential from the point of view of
the optimal choices. To see this, notice that given the same unobserved characteristics, the
observed state vectors for both strategies in period t + 2, given by (0,w˜it+1, x
′
it+2), do not
differ neither in wealth nor in portfolio allocation. Value functions for both strategies at
time t+ 2 that are conditional on identical state vectors, are identical as well. These future
value functions will cancel out while taking differences between them in equation (2.3.3),
thus inducing finite dependence.
The uncertainty about the future wealth comes from uncertainty on future returns on
stocks. In this case wealth at time t+ 1 depends on the realization of the rates of return on
stock holding that is unknown to a household when it makes participation choices at time
t. In order to integrate over the uncertain returns on risky portfolio allocations, I discretize
all possible realizations of the returns on stock holdings denoting it as k to allow for up to
K possible states conditional on investing, generally described as high, moderate and low
realizations (H, M , L). Transition probabilities associated with the uncertainty on returns
on stock holdings are degenerate if household chooses not to invest in stock market at time
t. If household participates in stock market in the current period, then the probability that
household’s liquid wealth moves to one of the possible K states will depend on the realization
of the return on household’s portfolio moving over thoseK states. Transition probabilities are
set to be independent from individual investor characteristics, so that F (zkit+1|zit) = Fkt+1.
For strategies (2.3.4) and (2.3.5) the equation (2.3.3) can now be represented as follows:
ln
[
pit
1− pit
]
= u(zit, dit = 1)− u(zit, dit = 0) (2.3.6)
+ β
[
K∑
k=1
(u(zkit+1, dit+1 = 0)− u(z0it+1, dit+1 = 0)) + ln(pkit+1)− ln(p0it+1)
]
Fkt+1
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2.4 ESTIMATION
Estimation of the equation (2.3.6) follows a three-step estimation strategy. Followed by
specification of participation costs and households’ preferences over consumption and in-
vestment choices, I derive the equation to be estimated. Next, I discuss estimation of the
nuisance parameters. Nuisance parameters include estimates of fixed effects (estimates of
unobserved individual heterogeneity), estimates of aggregate shocks as well as estimates of
conditional choice probabilities. These parameters need to be estimated before the param-
eters in the utility and the participation cost are estimated. In particular, fixed effects and
aggregate shocks are estimated to be included into the conditioning set of the value function
and conditional choice probabilities. The estimates of conditional choice probabilities are
then incorporated into the equation (2.3.6) that estimates parameters in the utility and the
participation cost.
2.4.1 Preferences
Households derive utility from the consumption good cit, denoted by u
c
it = u(cit). I specify
the utility of consumption as
ucit = ct − ξtc2t
where ξt can be a constant or a function of household’s demographic characteristics. Quadratic
utility of consumption is one of the leading models in financial industry due to its desirable
mean-variance portfolio selection properties. In the current paper, its use is appealing as it
renders the estimation problem as linear. One of the potential disadvantages of the quadratic
utility is that the negative marginal utility of consumption is not ruled out. Therefore, once
the estimation of the utility parameters is achieved, it is important to rule out parameter
values that allow marginal utility of consumption to be negative for all possible values of
consumption data.
I also allow for non-pecuniary portfolio choice dependent utility cost from seeking ad-
vantage of higher equity premium through investing in stocks. The utility cost of adjusting
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portfolio composition is denoted as udit = u(dit, αit, αit−1) and specified as:
udit = γ0dit + γ1αitαit−1,
where γ0 is the choice specific utility shifter and γ1 is the parameter of adjusting portfolio
allocation between time t− 1 and t.
Then the utility payoff for household i is defined as u(zit, dit) = u
c
it + u
d
it and depends on
consumption, current and past investment choices, as well as other characteristics in state
vector.
2.4.2 Participation Cost
Participation cost ρit is incorporated into the wealth accumulation budget constraint. In
the literature it is common to impose a rather broad meaning on the costs of stock market
participation for individuals. It embraces all fixed costs to participation that investors may
incur. It may also be interpreted as an opportunity cost of time and effort for stock market
participation.
To evaluate the behavior of households under the strategies (2.3.4) and (2.3.5) and com-
pare the conditional value function for identical households taking different strategies, it
is important that the participation cost is specified to depend only on the characteristics
that are observed for each household regardless if this household participates or not.10 I
parameterize the participation cost as a function of household’s labor income as a monetary
measure of the opportunity cost, and also as a function of age, education, and past partic-
ipation choices as proxies for the experience and the ability to absorb and process financial
knowledge and information. Specifically, I write participation cost as a linear combination
of household’s observed characteristics:
ρt = δy
l
txt
where xt = (1, edut, aget, age
2
t , dt−1) and y
l is labor income.
10For this reason I cannot use information related to stock buys and sells as well as total accumulated
stock holdings because this information is available for participants only.
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2.4.3 The Moment Conditions
I proceed to elaborate the equation (2.3.6). The conditional value functions associated with
strategies (2.3.4) and (2.3.5) are:
v1(zit) = c
1
t (1− ξtc1t ) + γ0dit + γ1αitαit−1
+ β
[
K∑
k=1
c1t+1(1− ξt+1c1t+1) + ln(p1kit+1) + βVt+2(zt+2)
]
Fkt+1
v0(zit) = c
0
t (1− ξtc0t )
+ β
[
K∑
k=1
c0t+1(1− ξt+1c0t+1) + ln(p0it+1) + βVt+2(zt+2)
]
Fkt+1
While the data on wealth and income are available, total household consumption is not
reported in the PSID. To circumvent this problem, I compute the measure of household’s
consumption from the budget constraint:
cit = R
p
itwit−1 + yit − wit − ditρit
= cˆpit − ditρit
where cˆpit is a function of household’s data and the return on portfolio. In addition, cˆ
f
it will also
be used with indication that the only return on portfolio is the risk free rate. Consumption
is assumed to be additively separable from participation cost. It is important to note that
from the above it does not follow that consumers who invest in stock consume less, however,
their wealth is smaller in period t by the amount of participation cost.
The choice of share of wealth invested in stocks, conditional on the participation decision,
plays an important role in recovering participation cost. The key feature of the estimation
of the participation cost is the intertemporal utility cost and benefits analysis for different
participation strategies, where participation cost is tied up with the amount of wealth that
households consider investing in stocks. On one hand, participation cost reduces wealth
today, while next period a household receives an expected increase in wealth depending on
the amount invested in stocks. On the other hand, households may choose not to invest in
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stocks today, but instead keep all wealth (including the not forgone participation cost) in
risk free assets. The next period, however, the household can only receive a risk free return
on the not given up participation cost.
To illustrate the idea, consider two identical households n and i who act under two
distinct alternatives (2.3.4) and (2.3.5), respectively. Recall that one of the alternatives is
to participate in period t and quit stock markets in period t + 1. The other alternative is
to not participate in periods t and t + 1. Consider household i whose observed choice is to
participate in period t. One of the key assumptions is that the observed wealth on period t
for this household is net time t participation cost: wit|(dit = 1) = Rpitwit−1 + yit − cit − ρit.
Wealth in period t of household n will be greater than wealth in period t for household i by
the amount of participation cost: (wnt +ρnt)|(dnt = 0) = Rpntwnt−1 + ynt− cnt. Identical time
t state vector implies that time t consumption for both households is the same, therefore
utility of consumption for these households is identical in period t. Under these two strategies,
however, period t+ 1 consumption is different as it is affected by different wealth in period
t. Under the first strategy cit+1 = (αit(R
s
it+1 −Rft+1) +Rft+1)wit + yit+1 − wit+1, while under
the second strategy cnt+1 = R
f
t+1(wnt + ρnt) + ynt+1 −wnt+1. In the data it is unlikely to see
two households with identical continuous state vectors. Therefore, it can also be intuitive
to think about the same household that considers making different participation choices in
period t. The differences in two participation strategies can be illustrated by looking at
transition of wealth from period t to period t+ 1 under these strategies:
Alternative (dt = 1, dt+1 = 0, ...)
wt = R
p
twt−1 + yt − ct − ρt
wt+1 = (R
s
t+1 −Rft+1)αtwt +Rft+1wt + yt+1 − ct+1
Alternative (dt = 0, dt+1 = 0, ...)
wt + ρt = R
p
twt−1 + yt − ct
wt+1 = R
f
t+1ρt +R
f
t+1wt + yt+1 − ct+1
It follows that under two distinct strategies, a household chooses between giving up the
amount ρt in period t and next period get an expected increase in wealth in the amount of
(Rst+1 − Rft+1)αtwt versus not participating at period t and receive Rft+1ρt next period. At
period t+2 the state vector zt+2 under both strategies becomes identical, therefore the value
functions Vt+2 become identical under two alternatives as well.
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After taking differences in contemporaneous utilities, only the utility cost of adjusting
one’s portfolio will remain: u(zit, dit = 1)−u(zit, dit = 0) = γ0dit+γ1αitαit−1. The difference
in utilities at time t+ 1 is more involved. Denote consumption under participation strategy
as c1t+1, and c
0
t+1 as consumption for non-participation strategy. Then the difference between
utility payoffs is:
(c1t+1 − c0t+1)− ξt(c1t+1 − c0t+1)(c1t+1 + c0t+1) =
(c1t+1 − c0t+1)
[
1− ξt(c1t+1 + c0t+1)
]
=
(αtwˆt+1 −Rft+1ρt)
[
1− ξt(2cft+1 + αtWˆt+1 +Rft+1ρt)
]
Therefore the optimality condition (2.3.6) becomes11:
ln
( pit
1− pit
)
= γ0dit + γ1αitαit−1
+ β
K∑
k
[
(αitwˆ
k
it+1 −Rft+1ρit)
[
1− ξ(2cfit+1 + αitwˆkit+1 +Rft+1ρit)
]
+ ln
p1kt+1
p0it+1
]
Fkt+1
where wˆkit+1 = wit(R
sk
it+1 −Rfit+1) is a function of data, conditional on participation.
Let Θ denote all unknown parameters in the model to be estimated. These parameters
include the utility parameters γ0,γ1,ξ and the parameters of the participation cost δ. I fix
the value of time discount factor β and estimate the remaining parameters conditioning on
β. I rearrange and combine terms represented by observables to get the equation:
mit(Θ) = Yit −XitΘ (2.4.1)
where
Yit = ln
( pit
1− pit
)
− β
K∑
k
[
αitwˆ
k
it+1 + ln
p1kt+1
p0it+1
]
Fkt+1
Xit = (1, αitαit−1, βRft ylitxit, β
∑K
k αtwˆ
k
t+1(2c
f
t+1+αtwˆ
k
t+1)Fkt+1,
2βRft c
f
t+1y
l
itxit, βR
f2
t
∑L
l=1 x
2
lit, 2βR
f2
t
∑L−1
l=1
∑L
q=l+1 xlitxqit)
11The equation (2.3.6) is derived and estimated in levels of consumption, as typically done in the micro-
level consumption models. The effect of consumption growth on current investment decisions is left beyond
the scope of this paper.
55
where L is the dimension of xit. Θ = (Θ1,Θ2), where Θ1 =(γ0, γ1, δ, ξ) has dimension
2 +L+H, and Θ2=(ξδ, ξδ
2, ξ(δ1δ2, ..., δL−1δL)) has dimension 2HL+HL(L−1)/2, where δ
is a vector of parameters (δ1, ..., δL) with the same dimension as xit and H is the dimension
of ξ. My primary interest is only in Θ1. In the estimation I do not impose any restrictions
on Θ2 and estimate unrestricted equation (2.4.1) that is linear in parameters.
Once the conditional choice probabilities and the transition probabilities were observed or
estimated, I could estimate the unknown structural parameters of interest from a conditional
moment condition
E [m(Xit, Yit,Θo)|zit] = 0, (2.4.2)
where the subscript o denotes the true value of the parameters. The minimum distance
estimator is a natural estimator choice in this and similar frameworks.
2.4.4 Individual Effects and Aggregate Shocks
In the literature different methods are proposed to incorporate unobserved heterogeneity
in dynamic discrete choice models. Altug and Miller (1998) estimate fixed effects from an
auxiliary regression related to the main model. More recent studies of Arcidiacono and Miller
(2008) and Kasahara and Shimotsu (2009) propose alternative ways through finite mixture
distributions. The approach of Kasahara and Shimotsu is restrictive for my estimation.
For identification of unobserved heterogeneity it requires the time dimension of a panel
that is beyond the one available in the data at hand. The identification requirements in
Arcidiacono and Miller are similar to those as in the study of Kasahara and Shimotsu. I
adopt the approach of Altug and Miller and use the earnings equation to estimate individual
unobserved effects.
The same earnings equation allows me to estimate time effects as well. In my framework,
current wealth accumulation is affected by aggregate shocks on current wages and rates of
return. Aggregate shocks on rates of return are captured by the risk-free rate, Rft . Aggregate
shocks on wages are not directly observed, but can be estimated.
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I assume that household’s earnings are affected by both time effects and individual effects,
hence I can estimate these effects by modeling the household’s earnings process. I consider
a dynamic earnings equation of the form:
yˆit = φyˆit−1 + x′itκ+ ωt + νi + eit (2.4.3)
where yˆit is the log-transformation of household’s labor income and x
′
it is an L-dimensional
vector of family characteristics for household i at time t, ωt is the unobserved time spe-
cific effect and νi is the unobserved individual specific effect. I follow Arellano and Hon-
ore (2001), assuming the predeterminedness condition of yˆit−1 and (possibly) xit, precisely
E(eit|yˆt−1i , x′ti ) = 0 and E(νi) = 0. Subject to a rank condition, (1 + L+ T − 1) parameters
of the model (2.4.3) are identified with T > 3. With T = 3 φ, κ′s, ω2, ω3 are just identified
from the 3 + L orthogonality conditions:
E


1
x′it
yˆit−2
( ∆yˆit − φ∆yˆit−1 −∆x′itκ−∆ωt )
 = 0 (2.4.4)
E
(
yˆit − φyˆit−1 − x′itκ− ωt
)
= 0
Estimation of the fixed effects, however, requires a larger T . The extended data set
covers T = 14 time periods of observations. The vector of family characteristics x′it contains
3 variables: family size, education multiplied by age and age squared. It makes 17 parameters
to estimate. The overidentified system of equations (2.4.3) contains 4 moment conditions
for each of T − 2 time periods making up to 48 orthogonality conditions for each household.
The four moment conditions include the unconditional moment condition in levels and the
moment conditions in first differences with a constant, income at time t− 2 and age squared
at time t as instruments. I estimate the system of equations (2.4.4) with the GMM procedure.
Table 2.4 reports the estimates of the earning equation (2.4.3). The estimates on family
size, education, and age are consistent with the general expectations. The household income
increases with the family size. It responds positively to the level of education and decreases
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Table 2.4: Earnings equation 1
Parameter Estimate Std.Err.
φ 0.856 0.038
κ′s :
family size 0.202 0.037
edu*age 0.577 0.063
age2 -0.863 0.088
ω1983 -0.720 0.357
∆ω1985 0.078 0.015
∆ω1987 -0.063 0.014
∆ω1989 -0.025 0.013
∆ω1991 -0.088 0.013
∆ω1993 0.012 0.013
∆ω1995 -0.108 0.016
∆ω1997 0.031 0.017
∆ω1999 0.084 0.018
∆ω2001 -0.025 0.015
∆ω2003 -0.071 0.015
∆ω2005 0.057 0.017
∆ω2007 -0.008 0.019
J test 10.5
p value 0.99
1 Number of time periods T = 14, number of households in the sample 7,744. Instruments include a
constant, age of head of household squared at time t, and labor income at time t− 2.
58
with the household growing older. The AR(1) coefficient on past earnings is estimated at 0.85
and statistically significant. Most estimates on ∆ωt are also statistically significant. With
the parameter estimates of the model (2.4.3), individual fixed effects are trivially estimated.
2.4.5 Conditional Choice Probabilities
I estimate conditional choice probabilities using methodology described in Hotz and Miller
(1993) and Altug and Miller (1998). Denote J [h−1N (z
N
ns−zNit )] as a multivariate kernel function
with an appropriately chosen matrix of bandwidths hN . For t = 1, ..., T I estimate conditional
participation rate nonparametrically using the kernel estimator:
pˆit =
∑N
n=1 dntJ [h
−1
N (z
N
nt − zNit )]∑N
n=1 J [h
−1
N (z
N
nt − zNit )]
Define the conditional choice probability pj(zlkit), j, l = 0, 1 and k = 0, ..., K, as a
probability that household i chooses alternative j in period t given that the alternative l was
chosen in period t− 1 and conditioned on realization of the state zlkit. I define the indicator
variables as follows:
d
(1)
lkit =
(1− dit−1) l = 0, k = 0dkitdit−1 otherwise
where dkit is equal to 1 if a household faces one of the K possible states of realization of returns
on stock holdings if the household invests in stock in period t− 1. Then the estimators for
conditional choice probabilities pj(zlkit) for t = 1, ..., T are computed as follows:
pˆj(zlkit) =
∑N
n=1 djntd
(1)
lkntJ [h
−1
N (z
N
ns − zNit )]∑N
n=1 d
(1)
lkntJ [h
−1
N (z
N
nt − zNit )]
The summary of nonparametric estimates of conditional choice probabilities is reported
in Table 2.5. The table also reports the number of observations used to calculate the proba-
bility associated with each relevant history zlkit as well as sample standard deviations. The
estimated conditional choice probabilities are limited to those relevant to the histories used
in the equation (2.3.6).
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Table 2.5: Sample averages of nonparametric estimates of conditional choice probabilities
Num.obs. Sample mean Sample std.dev.
1. p1it 10,639 0.256 0.300
2. p0(z0it) 9,412 0.889 0.089
3. p0(z1Hit) 10,590 0.030 0.108
4. p0(z1Mit) 10,588 0.016 0.084
5. p0(z1Lit) 10,608 0.138 0.248
In line 1 of Table 2.5 I report the participation rate p1it. Line 2 reports the probability of
not participating in the stock markets in period t conditional on non-participation in period
t − 1. Lines 3-5 report the probability of non-participation in stock markets in period t
conditional on participation in the previous time period and receiving high, moderate or low
return on the investment in stocks. The average estimated participation rate is 0.25. The
results also suggest that the probability of participation decreases if there is a history of
non-participation in a previous period to 0.11.
2.5 EMPIRICAL FINDINGS
Table 2.6 contains the estimation results for the utility parameters and parameters of the
participation cost. Columns (1)-(3) report estimates for the model with the simple quadratic
utility of consumption, columns (5)-(7) report estimates for the model with age augmented
quadratic utility of consumption.
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Table 2.6: Participation cost and utility parameters.
Parameters (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Utility parameters (ct − ξtc2t ) + γ0dt + γ1αtαt−1
ξt = ξ1 ξt = ξ1 + ξ2aget
γ0 31.239
∗
(5.412)
41.486∗
(3.650)
39.223∗
(3.289)
29.690∗
(4.734)
34.671∗
(2.861)
30.985∗
(2.045)
γ1 20.606
∗∗∗
(11.827)
12.106
(9.118)
10.899
(7.249)
19.396∗∗∗
(9.988)
9.402∗∗∗
(5.546)
1.525
(3.275)
ξ1 0.00050
∗
(0.00002)
0.00055∗
(0.00003)
0.00057∗
(0.00002)
0.00023∗∗
(0.00010)
−0.00030∗∗
(0.00014)
−0.00030∗
(0.00008)
ξ2 0.000006
∗
(0.000002)
0.000016∗
(0.000002)
0.000017∗
(0.000002)
Participation cost ρt = yt(δ1 + δ2edu+ δ3aget + δ4age
2
t + δ5dt−1)
δ1 0.0616
∗
(0.0165)
0.4553∗
(0.0563)
−0.0411
(0.1129)
0.0553∗
(0.0144)
0.2964∗
(0.0484)
0.1659∗
(0.0658)
δ2 −0.0194∗
(0.0031)
−0.0201∗
(0.0020)
−0.0120∗
(0.0023)
−0.0122∗
(0.0016)
δ3 −0.0011∗∗
(0.0005)
0.0229∗
(0.0048)
−0.0007
(0.0005)
0.0048∗∗∗
(0.0028)
δ4 −0.00027∗
(0.00005)
−0.00006∗∗
(0.00003)
δ5 −0.0179
(0.0139)
−0.0307∗∗
(0.0124)
−0.0376∗
(0.0100)
−0.0477∗
(0.0075)
Number of parameters 6 20 26 9 34 46
J-test 98 112 125 107 134 138
p-value 5e-7 4e-4 7e-4 5e-7 0.0051 0.087
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Participation cost
The estimation results for the participation cost seem to be intuitive and agree with pre-
vious findings. First, Gomes and Michaelides (2003) rationalize limited participation by the
existence of the participation cost. Second, empirical findings of Bertaut and Starr-McCluer
(2002), Guiso and Japelli (2002), Banks and Tanner (2002) show that the participation in
stock markets can be explained by such individual characteristics as age and education. The
findings in the current study relate to these results from previous work and show that the
participation cost is significantly different from zero and varies with household characteris-
tics.
Participation cost is estimated on average about 5.5−6.2% of labor income. Participation
cost measured as a share of income is not constant over the life cycle and admits the curvature
of the labor income profile. But the results also show that even holding the labor income
fixed, participation cost estimated to be significantly affected by age, education and previous
participation experience. Table 2.6 shows that participation cost is decreasing in education.
It is roughly decreasing with age. When the curvature in age is introduced in the participation
cost, it becomes increasing and concave in age, with the turning point around age of 35-40.
Finally, participation cost is smaller for households who participated in stock markets in
previous periods.
Results in Table 2.6 show that when demographic characteristics in participation cost
are not controlled for (columns (1) and (4)), the estimated participation cost admits sim-
ilar magnitudes. However, when age, education and past participation are controlled for,
the estimates in column (2) and (5), and in (3) and (6) differ substantially. On average,
participation cost in columns (2) and (3) is greater than in columns (5) and (6) by about
5%. It is illustrated on Figure 2.1. These differences can be explained by the influence of
age on participation cost and on the utility. The specification in columns (5) and (6) is
different from the one in columns (2) and (3) only through the age dependent parameter ξt
in the utility of consumption. Once the age is controlled for in the curvature of the utility
of consumption, the contribution of age into participation cost becomes smaller.
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Figure 2.1: Participation cost.
Figure 2.1 shows how participation cost (as a share of labor income) changes over age,
with other demographic characteristics fixed at their sample average levels. Panel B shows
that participation cost can be as large as 10% of labor income, however the age effect for
the line that corresponds to column (5) is estimated imprecisely. The lines corresponding
to columns (4) and (6) are constructed from the more precisely estimated coefficients and
suggest that the magnitude of participation cost is smaller. On average it is about 5-6%,
but decreases to as low as 1% when a household approaches retirement.
Utility parameters
Utility parameters include parameters on the curvature of the utility of consumption and
parameters of the utility benefit of stock market participation. The estimates of the ξt are
significant in all model specifications and indicate that the utility of consumption is concave.
The average value of ξt = ξ1 + ξ2aget is similar to the estimates of ξt in columns (1)-(3).
Even with the negative ξ1 in columns (5) and (6) ξt never takes negative values.
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All model specifications in Table 2.6 suggest that there is a positive utility shifter for the
households who participate in stock markets. In addition, the parameter on the portfolio
adjustment cost is marginally significant and positive. This positive estimate indicates on
complimentarity effect of past portfolio allocation on current portfolio allocation. Habits, or
rather inertia, in adjusting one’s portfolio share is consistent with previous findings in the
literature. Namely, Brunnermeier and Nagel (2008) argue that one of the major drivers of
households’ portfolio allocation is inertia.
The J tests associated with the model specifications reported in Table 2.6 indicate the
rejection of overidentifying restrictions implied by the choice of instruments. However, the
model specification (6) cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level; parameter estimates
from this specification are used in the simulation exercises presented below.
2.6 SIMULATION EXERCISES
I solve the model via backward induction using the estimated parameters of the model. I
use the parameter estimates reported in column (6) of Table 2.6. As the estimation uses
biannual data, I also solve the model recursively on a biannual basis. To align with the
estimation set up that considers households prior to retirement, I simulate households up to
the retirement stage. As a termination condition I assume that individuals die at age 67 not
leaving a positive bequest.
To solve the model I start with defining a grid on state variables, that is past share of
wealth invested in risky stocks and past wealth with earned rate of return on it, as well
as income. Then optimal share of wealth invested in risky assets and total wealth can be
solved for on the fine grid, with the help of estimated parameters on income process. The
interpolation off the grid is achieved with the second order polynomial regression of the value
function at each point of the grid on the corresponding state space vector.12 This regression
12Higher order polynomial regression was also tried, however, it produces less accurate predictions.
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provides a very accurate approximation to the value functions off the grid with R2 in range
of 0.98-0.99.
Once the solution is obtained, the model is simulated for 5,000 replications.13 No par-
ticipation in stock markets is chosen as a starting condition for all simulated individuals.
Conditional on the state variables, I compute the conditional choice value function for each
combination of the choice variables from the grid, using the interpolation coefficients ob-
tained at the solution as well as the draws of extreme value random variables. Then the
maximal conditional choice value function corresponds to the optimal choice of participation
decision, portfolio choice, and wealth. If a simulated consumer finds it optimal to participate
in stock markets, he receives the rate of return of stock holdings, drawn randomly as low,
moderate or high return with corresponding probabilities used in estimation as transition
probabilities.
Figure 2.2 compares (1) the average age-specific participation rate computed from the
data, (2) participation rate, predicted by probit model, estimated in the section on the data
description, and (3) participation rate, predicted by the structural model. Figure 2.2 shows
that the baseline model predicts very well the participation rate observed in the data.
2.6.1 Financial Education
The participation cost is an important instrument to evaluate the effectiveness of the eco-
nomic policies aimed to promote financial literacy among consumers. Recall that the par-
ticipation cost is estimated to be about 5-6% of labor income. The model of stock market
participation allows for a counterfactual simulation exercise aimed to predict the response
of consumers’ financial behavior to providing financial education and counseling. In order
to evaluate the potential impact of the financial education programs intervention, I treat
education that affects the participation costs as a proxy to the consumers’ ability to process
information, including information that is related to participation in financial markets. The
simulated response to the policy interventions is interpreted as a lower bound of the possible
13Greater number of simulations virtually does not make a difference.
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Figure 2.2: Participation rate: Data vs Simulation
66
response to financial counceling.
Providing financial education and counseling may have an effect on the participation
decision through the channel of participation cost that is decreasing with education. Recall
that the results in column (6) of Table 2.6 suggest that every additional year of education
decreases participation cost by 1.2 percentage points. To see how consumers respond to
providing financial counseling, I conduct two counterfactual simulation exercises. The first
simulation exercise shows how investors respond to an unexpected one unit increase in edu-
cation that lowers the participation cost. The second exercise evaluates the responde to the
same increase in education, however, contrary to the first unexpected increase, this increase is
anticipated by an investor. The ”financial” education affects participation decision through
participation cost, but does not affect the amount of schooling that determines consumers’
income process.
The result of this counterfactual simulation is illustrated by Figure 2.3. As expected,
simulated consumers respond positively to financial counseling. Their participation rate is
greater than that of baseline consumers. The difference between participation of financially
advised and baseline consumers grows by up to 4%. The response to the anticipated increase
in financial education takes place sooner than the response to an unexpected increase. Con-
sumers who anticipate the decrease in participation costs due to extra financial education
show a smoother policy response. Shortly after the policy intervention, both participation
rates become equal.
2.7 CONCLUSION
In this paper I make an attempt to rationalize the limited stock market participation at
the micro level. I develop and estimate a dynamic structural model of individual stock
market participation and portfolio choice; estimation is achieved using longitudinal data on
household wealth, stock holdings and income taken from the PSID. The model allows for
67
Figure 2.3: Participation rate, financial education program intervention.
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endogenous investment choices and intertemporal nonseparabilities in preferences. Decisions
regarding stock market participation are influenced by participation costs modelled using
a flexible functional form to account for individual heterogeneity. The estimation results
support the significant participation cost to stock market participation. Participation cost
is estimated on average about 5.5− 6.2% of labor income and can be explained by such de-
mographic characteristics as consumers’ age, education and past stock market participation
experience. In addition, I find evidence of inertia in portfolio allocation.
Model estimates are then used to conduct simulation exercises in order to evaluate the
possible effectiveness of financial education programs. The model estimates not only make
economic sense but also facilitate simulated paths for the decision to participate in stock
markets that successfully line up with patterns observed in the data. I investigate how the
stock market participation decision can be affected when consumers receive a reasonable
amount of financial counseling. In my analysis I allow for up to two weeks of additional fi-
nancial education per year and show that consumers respond positively to financial education
programs in that the financial market participation increases by 4 /
While the results obtained at the estimation of the model seem to be intuitive and agree
with previous findings, an important caveats to this analysis need to be mentioned. First,
it is likely that the observed income and wealth data are measured with substantial error.
In addition to the usual measurement error, the data in wealth supplement of the PSID
are known to suffer from systematic underreporting of trades. The “forgotten” trades affect
the computed idiosyncratic rates of return. In the current study I address this problem
by refereing to the market index as the rate of return. However, the measurement error
problem still remains a vital issue and needs a proper treatment. Second, the current analysis
focuses on the participation decision and portfolio choice mostly for prime age individuals.
However, it also is interesting to look at the transition of the participation rate from prime
age, considered in this paper, to the retirement stage. This is an important problem and is
deferred for the future research. Finally, the household stock holdings represent only a part of
risky assets. Housing, business, other risky accounts such as individual retirement accounts
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amount for a bigger part of household financial portfolio. Depending on the structure of all
household assets, limited participation in stock markets and smaller shares of liquid wealth
invested in stocks directly can be explained by a certain diversification strategy.
With the above limitations to the current analysis this paper is the first analysis of the
stock market participation and portfolio composition that allows for heterogeneity in the
participation cost and estimates the magnitude of it in micro data. I find a strong evidence
that households with experience in stock market participation face smaller participation
cost. The results show that the participation cost is increasing and concave with age and
decreasing with education. Another novelty of the paper constitutes the counterfactual
simulation exercise that shows how education programs can influence the consumers’ financial
decisions. In general, the results contribute to the broad strand of the literature on life cycle
consumption and investment decisions, as well as on idiosyncratic response to consumer
financial protection policy initiatives.
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APPENDIX A
DERIVATION OF THE MOMENT CONDITION
In order to obtain an expression in terms of observed consumption, we consider Equation
(3.1) piece by piece and express observed consumption in terms of true consumption and
measurement error as stated above. Let Cit = (cit−1, cit, cit+1, cit+2, rit+1), let C∗it be the
counterpart of the vector Cit where true consumption is replaced by observed consumption,
and let =it = (ηit−1, ηit, ηit+1,ηit+2) be the corresponding vector of measurement errors. We
start with the first term.
ECit,=it|Zit
[
β(1+rit+1)
ϕit+1
g∗
it+1
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g∗it+1
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it
)1−γ]
=
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A1,
Under assumption 1.3.4, it can be shown that A1 = exp{σ2 (α2(1− γ)2 + γ2 − αγ(1− γ))}.
Hence
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The second and the third terms are transformed in the same way to get
ECit|Zit
[
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(
g∗it+1
g∗α
it
)1−γ]
,
Again, under Assumption 1.3.4 we find that
A2 = exp{σ2
(
α2(1− γ)2 + γ2 + (1− γ)(1 + α))},
A3 = exp{σ2
(
(1 + α + α2)(1− γ)2)}.
The moment condition (Equation 1.3.1) for (unobserved) true consumption is therefore trans-
formed into a moment condition for observed consumption:
ECit,=it|Z∗it
[
βA−11 (1+rit+1)
ϕit+1
g∗
it+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗α
it
)1−γ(
1−αβA1A2 ϕit+2
(
g∗it+2
g∗α
it+1
)1−γ)
−(
1−αβA−13 ϕit+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗α
it
)1−γ)]
= 0 (A.0.1)
where Z∗it is a q-dimensional observable subset of Zit that can include current and past
interest rates as well as observable consumption growth up to time t− 2.
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APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM ??
Let θ˜ be an alternative vector of parameters that satisfy equation (1.3.3) and define Γ(x∗i,t+2) =
ρ(x∗it+2, θ0)− ρ(x∗it+2, θ˜) so that
E
[
Γ(x∗i,t+2)|z∗it
]
= 0.
Then by Assumption 1.3.5.1, for at least one t we have that
Γ(x∗i,t+2) = 0. (B.0.1)
Setting δ = 0, γ = 1, and αβ = κ1 = κ2/κ3, then equation (B.0.1) is solved trivially.
Assumption 1.3.5.3 eliminates this trivial solution. Differentiating equation (B.0.1) by g∗i,t+2
and noting that g∗i,t > 0 for i and t obtains
α0(1− γ0)β20(1 + rit+1)ϕit+1(δ0)ϕit+2(δ0)
(
g∗it+1
g∗α0it
)1−γ0 (g∗it+2
g∗α0it+1
)1−γ0
=
α˜(1− γ˜)β˜2(1 + rit+1)ϕit+1(δ˜)ϕit+2(δ˜)
(
g∗it+1
g∗α˜it
)1−γ˜ (g∗it+2
g∗α˜it+1
)1−γ˜
. (B.0.2)
Differentiating equation (B.0.2) with respect to g∗i,t+2 and again noting that g
∗
i,t > 0 for i and
t gives
α0(1− γ0)2β20(1 + rit+1)ϕit+1(δ0)ϕit+2(δ0)
(
g∗it+1
g∗α0it
)1−γ0 (g∗it+2
g∗α0it+1
)1−γ0
=
α˜(1− γ˜)2β˜2(1 + rit+1)ϕit+1(δ˜)ϕit+2(δ˜)
(
g∗it+1
g∗α˜it
)1−γ˜ (g∗it+2
g∗α˜it+1
)1−γ˜
. (B.0.3)
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Therefore, from equations (B.0.2) and (B.0.3) we have that γ0 = γ˜. Differentiating equation
(B.0.2) with respect to g∗i,t obtains
α20(1− γ0)2β20(1 + rit+1)ϕit+1(δ0)ϕit+2(δ0)
(
g∗it+1
g∗α0it
)1−γ0 (g∗it+2
g∗α0it+1
)1−γ0
=
α˜2(1− γ˜)2β˜2(1 + rit+1)ϕit+1(δ˜)ϕit+2(δ˜)
(
g∗it+1
g∗α˜it
)1−γ˜ (g∗it+2
g∗α˜it+1
)1−γ˜
. (B.0.4)
From equations (B.0.2) and (B.0.4) and γ0 = γ˜ conclude that α0 = α˜. Substituting what we
have so far into equation (B.0.2) obtains
β20ϕit+1(δ0)ϕit+2(δ0) = β˜
2ϕit+1(δ˜)ϕit+2(δ˜)⇒
2 ln(β0) + ∆2wi,t+2δ0 = 2 ln(β˜) + ∆2wi,t+2δ˜ ⇒
Qi,t+2D0 = Qi,t+2D˜, (B.0.5)
where Qi,t+2 = (1,∆2wi,t+2) and D = (2 ln(β), δ
′)′. Then from equation (B.0.5) we have that
E[Q′i,t+2Qi,t+2]D0 = E[Q
′
i,t+2Qi,t+2]D˜,
which by Assumption 1.3.5.2 obtains D0 = D1, that is, δ0 = δ˜ and β0 = β˜. Finally substi-
tuting what we have so far into equation (B.0.1) obtains
X1κ0,1 +X2κ0,2 +X3κ0,3 = X1κ˜1 +X2κ˜2 +X3κ˜3, (B.0.6)
where X1 = 1, X2 = β0(1 + rit+1)
ϕit+1
g∗it+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗αit
)1−γ0
, and X3 = α0β0ϕit+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗αit
)1−γ0
. Full
rank of E[X ′X], where X = (X1, X2, X3), comes from variation in ri,t+1 and the functional
difference between g
∗(1−γ0)
it+1 and g
∗(−γ0)
it+1 . This and equation (B.0.6) obtains κ0,1 = κ˜1, κ0,2 = κ˜2,
and κ0,3 = κ˜3.
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APPENDIX C
CONSTRUCTION OF THE SIMULATION EXERCISE
The generic household maximizes remaining lifetime discounted expected utility with respect
to consumption stream {cs, s = t, · · · , T} subject to intertemporal budget constraint:
Et
T∑
s=t
βs−tφs
c˜1−γs − 1
1− γ
s.t. at+1 = (1 + rt+1)(at + yt − ct) (C.0.1)
where c˜t = ct/c
α
t−1 and expectation is taken conditional on all information for the household
at time t, ct denotes real consumption of a single homogenous nondurable good, at denotes
assets held by the household, yt household’s labor income and rt the real net interest rate
faced by the household at time t. In simulation we also augment utility with household-
specific “taste shifter” φt, defined similar to estimation part of the paper. It is assumed that
the length of life T is finite and known with certainty. It is also assumed that the household
has no bequest motive so that aT = 0. The time discount factor β and habit formation
parameter α are positive, and γ > 1.
Labor income yt is decomposed into the following components: permanent pt and tran-
sitory ut so that we have:
yt = ptut
pt+1 = ptvt+1
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where the transitory income shock ut and permanent income shock vt are iid lognormal with
unit mean and constant variances (eσ
2
u − 1) and (eσ2v − 1), respectively. We assume that
innovations to income are independent over time and across households, hence there are no
aggregate income shocks.
The interest rate is generated by a stationary AR(1) process:
rt+1 = (1− ρ)µr + ρrt + υt+1
where µr is the unconditional mean, ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the autoregressive coefficient and υt+1 is
iid normal with zero mean and variance σ2υ.
We redefine the budget constraint in (C.0.1) in terms of cash on hand xt = at + yt:
xt+1 = (1 + rt+1)(xt − ct) + yt+1 (C.0.2)
Then we rewrite all relevant variables in terms of their ratios to the permanent income:
zˆt = zt/pt, where zt = xt, ct, yt. Then the budget constraint (C.0.2) takes the form:
xˆt+1 = (1 + rt+1)
(xˆt − cˆt)
vt+1
+ ut+1
Represent consumption growth rate gˆt =
cˆt
cˆt−1
. Then the Euler condition is given as:
Et
[
β(1+rt+1)
ϕt+1
gˆt+1vt+1
(
gˆt+1
gˆαt
vt+1
vαt
)1−γ(
1−αβϕt+2
(
gˆt+2
gˆαt+1
vt+2
vαt+1
)1−γ)
−
(
1−αβϕt+1
(
gˆt+1
gˆαt
vt+1
vαt
)1−γ)]
=0 (C.0.3)
where ϕt = exp(δ
′∆wt) and wt are household-related characteristics other than consumption.
In particular, we use past income and current age squared as such characteristics.
In Table C we summarize the values of parameters we use in this simulation exercise. The
“deep” parameters of the model are taken as follows: utility curvature parameter equals to 5,
habit formation parameter equals to 0.85, and time discount factor equals to 0.95. The values
of parameters governing the stochastic environment are largely borrowed from the related
literature. Given the shocks to income process and the interest rate, we solve for optimal
consumption rule recursively, starting from terminal condition cˆT = xˆT . The consumption
rule at time t is a function of three endogenous state variables cˆt−1, xˆt, rt and two exogenous
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state variables ut and vt. The solution is obtained over a fine grid on continuous state
variables cˆt−1 and xˆt. Every time period the household is allowed to borrow the amount it
can pay back with certainty by the end of its life, which determines xˆmin for the grid on xˆ for
each time period t. Following Tauchen (1986) we approximate the interest rate by first order
discrete Markov process. The algorithm produces cˆt as the solution for the Euler equation
(C.0.3) for each quintuple (cˆt−1, xˆt, rt, vt, ut).
As the state space is relatively large for this simulation problem, we limit grid points
to 20 for cˆt−1 and xˆt, to 5 for rt and to 3 for vt and ut. After obtaining the solution for
cˆt we use a polynomial regression to approximate cˆ(cˆt−1, xˆt) for each (discretized) choice of
rt, vt and ut. Life-time consumption paths are simulated using starting values on cˆ0 and xˆ1
and generated random draws for interest rates and shocks related to income process. We
simulate 40-period consumption paths for 4000 ex ante identical individuals and remove first
8 and last 8 years to obtain 24-period time dimension of the simulated panel data.
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Table C1: Parameter values used in Monte Carlo simulation
Parameter
Utility curvature parameter, γ 5.0
Time discount factor, β 0.95
Habit formation parameter, α 0.85
Mean of the interest rate, µr 0.05
Autoregressive coefficient of rit, ρ 0.60
Standard deviation of interest rate shocks, συ 0.025
Standard deviation of permanent income innovation, σv 0.015
Standard deviation of transitory income innovation, σu 0.100
Variance of measurement errors, σ2η 0.06 (20% noise)
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APPENDIX D
INTERTEMPORAL ELASTICITY OF SUBSTITUTION
In this section we calculate individual-specific intertemporal elasticities of substitution .
Individual-specific intertemporal elasticity of substitution can be found from:
1
IESit
=
∣∣∣∂ ln MUitMUit+1
∂ ln cit+1
cit
∣∣∣
where
MUit
MUit+1
=
φit
cit
(
cit
cαit−1
)1−γ
− αβ φit+1
cit
(
cit+1
cαit
)1−γ
φit+1
cit+1
(
cit+1
cαit
)1−γ
− αβ φit+2
cit+1
(
cit+2
cαit+1
)1−γ
=
(
1− αβϕit+1
(
git+1
gαit
)1−γ )
ϕit+1
git+1
(
git+1
gαit
)1−γ (
1− αβϕit+2
(
git+2
gαit+1
)1−γ ) (D.0.1)
Taking logs of (D.0.1) and partial derivatives with respect to ln git+1 = ln(cit+1 cit) we obtain:
1
IESit
= γ −
αβ(1− γ)ϕit+1
(
git+1
gαit
)1−γ
1− αβϕit+1
(
git+1
gαit
)1−γ − α2β(1− γ)ϕit+2
(
git+2
gαit+1
)1−γ
1− αβϕit+2
(
git+2
gαit+1
)1−γ (D.0.2)
Since α ≥ 0 and γ ≥ 1, we obtain the following bounds
1
IESit
≥ γ, IESit ≤ 1
γ
. (D.0.3)
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These inequalities are strict for α > 0 and γ > 1. In order to derive bounds for the (inverse)
IES, we must take into account measurement errors in observed consumption. To do so we
first rewrite equation (D.0.2) as follows
1
IESit
= γ − αβ(1− γ)ϕit+1
(
git+1
gαit
)1−γ∑∞
j=0
(
αβϕit+1
(
git+1
gαit
)1−γ)j
−α2β(1− γ)ϕit+2
(
git+2
gαit+1
)1−γ∑∞
j=0
(
αβϕit+2
(
git+2
gαit+1
)1−γ)j
= γ − (1− γ)∑∞j=1(αβϕit+1 (git+1gαit )1−γ
)j
−α(1− γ)∑∞j=1(αβϕit+2 (git+2gαit+1)1−γ
)j
,
which is a valid representation since the assumption of positive marginal utilities implies
that each term in the infinite sum is between 0 and 1. For the same reason, the dominated
convergence theorem applies and we find that
E
[
1
IESit
|zit
]
= γ − (1− γ)∑∞j=1E
[(
αβϕit+1
(
git+1
gαit
)1−γ)j
|zit
]
−α(1− γ)∑∞j=1E
[(
αβϕit+2
(
git+2
gαit+1
)1−γ)j
|zit
]
,
Next, for each j we have that
E
[(
αβϕit+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗αit
)1−γ)j
|zit
]
= E
[(
αβϕit+1
(
git+1
gαit
)1−γ)j ((
vit+1
vαit
)1−γ)j
|zit
]
= E
[(
αβϕit+1
(
git+1
gαit
)1−γ)j
|zit
]
E
[((
vit+1
vαit
)1−γ)j
|zit
]
.(D.0.4)
Because j ≥ 1. Jensen’s inequality implies that
E
((vit+1
vαit
)1−γ)j
|zit
 ≥ (E [(vit+1
vαit
)1−γ
|zit
])j
= Aj3. (D.0.5)
Notice that A3 is exactly the quantity defined in the derivation of the moment condition in
Appendix A. Therefore,
E
(αβϕit+1(g∗it+1
g∗αit
)1−γ)j
|zit
 ≥ E
(αβϕit+1(git+1
gαit
)1−γ)j
|zit
Aj3 (D.0.6)
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Combining equations (D.0.3), (D.0.4) and (D.0.6), we find that
γ ≤ E
[
1
IESit
|zit
]
≤ γ − (1− γ)∑∞j=1 E
[(
A−13 αβϕit+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗αit
)1−γ)j
|zit
]
−α(1− γ)∑∞j=1E
[(
A−13 αβϕit+2
(
g∗it+2
g∗αit+1
)1−γ)j
|zit
]
,
with strict inequalities if α > 0 and γ > 1. Again, by Jensen’s inequality we have that
(E[1/IESit|zit])−1 ≤ E[IESit|zit]. The corresponding bound for E[IESit|zit] is given by
1
γ
≥ E [IESit|zit] ≥
(
γ − (1− γ)∑∞j=1E
[(
A−13 αβϕit+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗αit
)1−γ)j
|zit
]
−α(1− γ)∑∞j=1E
[(
A−13 αβϕit+2
(
g∗it+2
g∗αit+1
)1−γ)j
|zit
])−1
.
Under the assumption that measurement errors are distributed log-normal as in Section 1.3,
the inverse IES is point identified. To see this, note that under this assumption,
E
((vit+1
vαit
)1−γ)j
|zit
 = Aj23 ,
where A3 = exp{σ2 ((1 + α + α2)(1− γ)2)}. Then straightforward calculations give
E
[
1
IESit
|zit
]
= γ − (1− γ)∑∞j=1E
[
A−j23
(
αβϕit+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗αit
)1−γ)j
|zit
]
−α(1− γ)∑∞j=1E
[
A−j23
(
αβϕit+2
(
g∗it+2
g∗αit+1
)1−γ)j
|zit
]
.
The parametric distributional assumption for measurement errors does not entail point iden-
tification of the IES, but does reduce the bound as follows
1
γ
≥ E [IESit|zit] ≥
(
γ − (1− γ)∑∞j=1 E
[
A−j23
(
αβϕit+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗αit
)1−γ)j
|zit
]
−α(1− γ)∑∞j=1 E
[
A−j23
(
αβϕit+2
(
g∗it+2
g∗αit+1
)1−γ)j
|zit
])−1
.
This bound is typically more narrow that that in equation (8.14) since A3 > 1 so that
A−j23 < A−j3 .
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APPENDIX E
RELATIVE RISK AVERSION
In this section we calculate individual-specific relative risk aversion parameters. These co-
efficients correspond to curvature and are closely related to the elasticities of the marginal
utility of consumption with respect to consumption. Individual-specific relative risk aversion
is defined as:
RRAit = −citΛ
cc
it
Λcit
where Λcit = MUit and Λ
cc
it =
∂MUit
∂cit
. Consequently, the risk aversion parameters implied by
our model are given by:
RRAit =
γ − αβϕit+1
(
git+1
gαit
)1−γ
− α2β(1− γ)ϕit+1
(
git+1
gαit
)1−γ
1− αβϕit+1
(
git+1
gαit
)1−γ (E.0.1)
If the observed consumption c∗ is contaminated with measurement errors, we must take these
into account when calculating individual-specific RRAs. We first rewrite equation (E.0.1) as
follows
RRAit = γ − (1 + α)(1− γ)
∞∑
j=1
(
αβϕit+1
(
git+1
gαit
)1−γ)j
.
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The same arguments as those used in the previous section also validate this expression.
Therefore, calculations similar to those in the previous section lead us to the inequalities
γ ≤ E [RRAit|zit] ≤ γ − (1 + α)(1− γ)
∞∑
j=1
E
(A−13 αβϕit+1(g∗it+1g∗αit
)1−γ)j
|zit
 ,
with strict inequality if α > 0 and γ > 1. Furthermore, if the log-normal assumption on
measurement errors is maintained, then we find that
E [RRAit|zit] = γ − (1 + α)(1− γ)
∞∑
j=1
E
A−j23
(
αβϕit+1
(
g∗it+1
g∗αit
)1−γ)j
|zit
 ,
where, again, A3 = exp{σ2 ((1 + α + α2)(1− γ)2)}.
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Table E1: Estimation of the Euler equation with habit formation (Detailed version of Table
1.3)
Nonparametric ME Log-normal ME No ME
Parameters Internal habit External habit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
γ 5.279 5.089 4.950 6.024 6.899 3.522 3.029 3.126
(0.057) (0.107) (0.099) (0.071) (2.460) (0.662) (0.366) (0.368)
β 0.987 0.973 0.929 0.983 0.955 0.897 0.956 0.801
(0.068) (0.013) (0.043) (0.025) (0.023) (0.049) (0.030) (0.170)
α 0.831 0.801 0.807 0.800 0.780 0.573 0.799 0.585
(0.016) (0.028) (0.028) (0.011) (0.092) (0.128) (0.115) (0.252)
a 0.473
(0.014)
σ2 0.042 0.072 0.036
(0.012) (0.008) (0.002)
% noise 35 45 32
Demographics:
family size 0.014 0.516 1.471 -0.365 0.078 0.025 -2.131 2.332
(0.144) (0.243) (0.178) (0.087) (0.545) (0.538) (0.731) (1.488)
age squared 1.567 0.304 0.882 2.018 0.099 0.395 2.122 -0.964
(0.206) (0.338) (0.191) (0.129) (0.544) (0.540) (0.634) (2.592)
Nonparametric ME:
κ1 0.016 0.176 0.028 0.037
(0.005) (0.053) (0.011) (0.015)
κ2 0.744 0.699 0.871 0.799
(0.385) (0.719) (0.650) (1.658)
κ3 0.763 0.377 0.958 0.540
(0.328) (1.138) (0.600) (1.258)
Some savings yes yes
Aggr. shocks:
t+1 -1.116 -0.244
(0.445) (0.179)
t+2 -0.375 -0.154
(0.413) (0.152)
t+3 -0.021 0.123
(0.476) (0.177)
t+4 0.987 0.161
(0.451) (0.168)
t+5 0.932 -0.026
(0.458) (0.160)
t+6 -1.169 -0.176
(0.453) (0.165)
t+7 -0.176 -0.093
(0.441) (0.150)
t+8 0.454 0.037
(0.455) (0.166)
t+9 -0.255 -0.145
(0.491) (0.162)
Q(θ) 0.008 0.006 0.014 0.009 0.009 0.007 0.017 0.181
J statistic 29.1 23.0 25.6 31.4 33.5 23.2 30.6 619.0
d.f. 42 33 42 41 44 35 44 45
p value 0.933 0.902 0.978 0.858 0.873 0.936 0.936 0.000
N 3,402 3,402 1,754 3,402 3,402 3,402 1,754 3,402
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